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I. INTRODUCTION
Theories of secondary liability, such as conspiracy and aiding and
abetting, have gained renewed prominence in light of the recent rash
of corporate financial fraud. The collapse of Enron is a prominent ex-
ample. Enron ranked seventh on the Fortune 500 list of America's
largest corporations in 2001, and was, by all appearances, an im-
mensely successful and profitable company.' But in December of
2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy, whereupon it was revealed that the
company was hiding tens of billions of dollars in debt through the use
of "off balance sheet" partnerships and other accounting irregulari-
ties.2 Enron's bankruptcy filing stayed most claims against it,3 and
its assets were insufficient to satisfy its creditors and shareholders in
any event. So Enron's victims looked for solvent defendants-such as
Enron's accountants, bankers, and lawyers-to sue on the theory that
they knew of and participated in Enron's fraud.4
1. See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at 5, In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at http://www.en-
ron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/InterimReport2ofExaminer.pdf.
2. See id. at 10-11.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (providing for automatic stay of claims against
debtor).
4. For example, a class action lawsuit led by the Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia was brought by Enron shareholders seeking at least $1.3 billion against
Enron's auditors, Arthur Andersen; nine Wall Street banks who had lent money
to or structured deals with Enron, including J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Mer-
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Whenever a tortfeasor is bankrupt or otherwise judgment-proof
(and even when it is not), resourceful plaintiffs will consider suing
agents and employees on conspiracy or related theories to increase
their chances of recovery. But suits against agents or employees for
participating in the wrongful acts of their principal or employer in-
volve an inherent tension. The nature of an agency relationship is
that the agent has a duty to act in a manner that furthers the princi-
pal's goals. 5 If it is the agent's job to assist the principal or employer,
when is it appropriate to impose liability on the agent for doing just
that?
A number of courts have restricted the liability of agents and em-
ployees by means of the "agent's immunity rule"-a rule that provides
that, as a matter of law, duly acting agents are incapable of conspiring
with their principal or employer. 6 The rule applies only where the
agent is acting on behalf of the principal and not for his or her own
personal gain.7 Courts have applied this rule to bar claims against
agents for conspiracies to commit a variety of common law civil torts,
such as fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference
with prospective economic advantage, and malicious prosecution.8
This Article argues that neither precedent nor policy justifies the ap-
plication of such a broad-based defense to civil conspiracy claims.
A trace of the historical roots of the agent's immunity rule reveals
that the rule is based on two distinct but related rationales. First, an
agent is privileged to induce a breach of, or interfere with, his or her
employer's contract.9 Second, and more commonly, when agents act
rill Lynch, and Credit Suisse First Boston; two prominent law firms who advised
Enron; and a number of individuals at these institutions. CNN/Money, Enron
Lawsuit Expanded (Apr. 8 2002), available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/04/08/
news/companies/enronsuit. According to Vincent Cappucci, an attorney repre-
senting the New York City and State of Florida pension funds in a separate suit,
"Enron and Andersen have no money. The challenge here is to bring in every
responsible party so that you can make the investors whole again." CNN/Money,
Enron Plaintiffs to Sue Wall St. (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://money.cnn.com/
2002/04/04news/enronplaintiffs/index.htm.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958) ("An agent is a fiduciary with
respect to matters within the scope of his agency."); Rianda v. San Benito Title
Guar. Co., 217 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. 1950) ("It is the duty of an agent to obey the
instructions of his principal .. ").
6. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 94.
8. See, e.g., Elliott v. Tilton, 89 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 1996) (fraud and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress); Black v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd. P'ship v. Jetz Serv. Co.,
931 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (champerty and malicious prosecution); Col-
lins v. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 662 P.2d 610 (Nev. 1983) (interference with
prospective economic advantage).
9. See infra notes 108-39 and accompanying text. The causes of action for induce-
ment of breach of contract and interference with contract are closely related, but
distinct. Inducement of breach requires that the third party actually bring about
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on behalf of the corporation, the corporation is deemed to be the sole
legal actor; thus, there can be no conspiracy because the corporation
cannot "agree" with itself.lO Neither of these rationales supports a
rule that immunizes agents against civil conspiracy claims generally.
The agent's privilege to induce a breach of the principal's contract
is justified by economic considerations that are unique to that cause of
action, which lies at the intersection of tort and contract. Courts do
not impose tort damages on contracting parties who breach to avoid
deterring the "efficient" breach-one where the breaching party can
make the non-breaching party "whole" by paying expectancy damages,
yet still come out ahead. 1 If tort liability via civil conspiracy were
imposed upon duly acting agents for effecting or recommending a
breach, contracting parties might internalize the cost through indem-
nification or by chilling the agent's conduct. The agent's privilege to
induce a breach thus helps preserve the contracting party's own "priv-
ilege" to breach and pay only expectancy damages. Agents are like-
wise privileged to conspire to induce a breach under the rationale that
someone immune from the underlying tort cannot be liable for con-
spiring to commit it-a notion referred to herein as the "underlying
duty requirement."
However, where the object of the alleged conspiracy is not a breach
of contract, but a tort such as fraud, these same considerations do not
apply. The principal is not "privileged" to commit fraud, so the agent
is not privileged to induce the principal to commit fraud, and likewise
should not be immune from conspiring with the principal to commit it.
Similarly, the single legal actor theory-the fiction that the agent's
acts are those of the principal, and thus that the "plurality" element of
conspiracy is absent-arose where policy considerations regarding the
underlying offense supported its application. The fiction is accepted in
the antitrust context, on the rationale that proscribing certain intra-
corporate combinations that restrain trade could chill legitimate busi-
ness conduct. However, the same fiction is rejected in the context of
criminal conspiracy, on the rationale that the increased danger aris-
a breach, whereas a cause of action for interference may lie-even where no
breach results-if the third party's conduct makes performance of the contract
more difficult or burdensome. E.g., Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. H.W. Ivey Con-
str. Co., 137 S.E.2d 528, 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 69
N.W.2d 667, 671 n.4 (Minn. 1955). For purposes of discussing whether an agent
does (or should) have a privilege to induce a breach of or interfere with the princi-
pal's contract, the differences between the two torts-essentially differences in
the nature of the disruption or injury-are immaterial. Accordingly, wherever
either interference with contract or inducement of breach of contract is referred
to herein, the reference should be understoou to include the other tort, unless the
context indicates otherwise.
10. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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ing from a group of criminal actors that justifies punishing conspiracy
generally exists even where the conspirators are all agents and em-
ployees of a single entity.
Whether the single legal actor theory is applied to bar common law
civil conspiracy claims against agents should depend on the policies of
the underlying tort. Using a policy-based analysis, the result should
be the same as that reached when applying the agent's privilege the-
ory: the agent should not be immune from conspiracy to commit most
torts. The fiction of an agent as an arm of the principal is entertained
so principals (especially corporate principals, who cannot act but
through agents) can conduct business, not so they can harm others.
Thus, where the agent "conspires" to induce a breach of the principal's
contract, the principal is seen under the efficient breach theory as
merely "doing business," and so the fiction of the single legal actor
should be respected. But where the object of the conspiracy is fraud,
battery, or any other intentional tort, no policy is furthered by immu-
nizing anyone who intentionally encourages or participates in the tort,
even agents who do so on behalf of their principals.
The impetus for courts to apply the agent's immunity rule to pro-
tect agents who act on behalf of the principal, but not those who act for
their own personal gain, is understandable. Courts may be reluctant
to impose liability on someone who did not actually commit a tort
based on something as ephemeral as an "agreement" (which itself may
be proved by circumstantial evidence). 12 That reluctance is likely
magnified where the defendant is an agent of the tortfeasor-the fact
that the agent worked in concert with his principal is not necessarily
circumstantial evidence of anything sinister. Where an agent is
merely acting on behalf of the principal, he is likely not the "bad guy"
who deserves punishment, but rather an unwitting pawn in the prin-
cipal's scheme. Conversely, where the agent acts not on the princi-
pal's behalf, but for his own personal gain, there is an inference that
he knew about and intended to achieve the wrongful result of the con-
spiracy. However, if an inference of scienter is what courts are driving
at when they apply the agent's immunity rule and the personal gain
exception, they should focus on conspiracy's intent element explicitly.
Part II of this Article provides some background on the doctrine of
civil conspiracy. Specifically, it examines the tendency in the civil con-
text to subordinate conspiracy-specific policies to tort-based policies.
Part III takes up the agent's immunity rule, and discusses how the
two doctrines from which it derives-the agent's privilege theory and
the single legal actor theory-likewise developed to promote the poli-
cies of specific underlying torts. The Article submits that, to the ex-
12. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Primer for Corpo-
rate Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 129, 143 & n.59 (1984) (collecting cases).
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tent that courts apply the agent's immunity rule to shield agents from
civil conspiracy liability generally, they are impairing conspiracy pol-
icy without furthering underlying tort policies, and are thus reaching
the wrong result. Part IV explores the factors that may be driving
courts to apply the agent's immunity rule. Part V concludes by sug-
gesting a policy-based analytical framework that avoids the problems
of the agent's immunity rule.
II. THE NATURE OF CIVIL CONSPIRACY
A. Civil Conspiracy Distinguished from Criminal
Conspiracy
The concept of conspiracy developed in English common law in the
late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Initially, the concept
focused on combinations to obstruct justice or falsely indict or acquit
an accused, and only later matured into the modern doctrine that gen-
erally proscribes combinations to commit unlawful acts.13 As the law
of conspiracy developed in America, it borrowed heavily from English
law.14 The criminal charge of conspiracy developed rapidly at early
common law, but the concept of civil conspiracy was not widely ac-
cepted until the eighteenth century. 15 In trying to understand civil
conspiracy, it is useful to compare it to the criminal counterpart from
which it derived.
At common law, a criminal conspiracy existed if there were: (1) two
or more persons; (2) an unlawful object or a lawful object to be accom-
plished by unlawful means; and (3) an agreement or meeting of the
minds on the object or course of action. 16 This last element requires
both that the parties intend to enter into an agreement and intend to
accomplish the object of the conspiracy.17 Many jurisdictions now re-
quire, in addition to the above elements, an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy by at least one of the co-conspirators.' 8 However, the
13. Brand Lawless Cooper, Civil Conspiracy and Interference with Contractual Rela-
tions, 8 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 302, 305 (1975); Thomas J. Leach, Civil Conspiracy:
What's the Use?, 54 U. MiAMi L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1999).
14. Leach, supra note 13, at 9.
15. Cooper, supra note 13, at 305.
16. See Cooper, supra note 13, at 305 n.16 (citing 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 35(1)
(1967); Pinkerton v. United States, 145 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1944)).
17. See People v. Backus, 590 P.2d 837, 855 (Cal. 1979) ("Conspiracy is a specific
intent crime, with the intent divided into two elements: (a) the intent to agree or
conspire, and (b) the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the con-
spiracy."); see also United States v. Scarbrough, 990 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, requires in-
tent to commit the substantive offense that is object of conspiracy).
18. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (requiring overt act by any one of the co-conspira-
tors); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003 (West 2001) (same); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 184 (West 1999) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 105.20 (McKinney 2004) (same).
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overt act requirement is a low hurdle: 19 it need not be committed by
the defendant;20 it need not be a criminal offense or even the "sub-
stantial step" required for an attempt;2 1 and it can be a wholly inno-
cent act in and of itself.22
Criminal conspiracy is an inchoate offense23 that is punished inde-
pendently of the underlying offense and regardless of whether that
underlying offense is ever committed. 24 One could thus be convicted
of conspiracy even if neither he nor any of his co-conspirators were
convicted of-or even indicted for-the underlying offense that was
the object of the conspiracy. 25 Accordingly, in the criminal context, it
is said that it is the combination itself-the very act of agreement-
that constitutes the offense. 26
By contrast, a civil conspiracy is not independently actionable. A
civil cause of action for conspiracy will not arise unless and until a tort
has been committed pursuant to the combination and damage results
from that tort. 27 Thus, the elements of a claim for civil conspiracy
19. See Benjamin F. Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328, 338 (1947)
("The courts somehow discover an overt act in the slightest action on the part of
the conspirators.").
20. See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 5.03(5) (1985) ("No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a
crime . . . unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and
proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.") (em-
phasis added).
21. See United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe overt act
required as an element of conspiracy need not have as immediate a connection to
the intended crime as the 'substantial step' required for an attempt. It is enough
that the overt act is 'taken to implement the agreement."') (citation omitted); In
re Cheri T., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("In the law of conspir-
acy, there is no requirement that the overt act itself be criminal, or even be an
attempt to commit the crime.").
22. United States v. Masiello, 491 F. Supp. 1154, 1164 (D. S.C. 1980). For example,
in a conspiracy to commit murder by poisoning the victim, the purchasing of post-
age stamps for the purpose of sending the poison through the mail can satisfy the
overt act requirement. People v. Corica, 130 P.2d 164, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
23. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. 1 (1985).
24. United States v. Romeros, 600 F.2d 1104, 1105 (5th Cir. 1979); People v.
Morante, 975 P.2d 1071, 1079-80 (Cal. 1999).
25. Romeros, 600 F.2d at 1105. Where all possible co-conspirators are tried together,
and all but one are acquitted, the conviction of the remaining co-conspirator can-
not stand. United States v. Sangmeister, 685 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1982).
However, where the prosecution tries one co-conspirator separately, or does not
indict all or any of the the other conspirators, the conspiracy conviction may
stand. Id.
26. E.g., People v. Fenenbock, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
27. E.g., Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182-83 (1913); Doctors' Co. v. Super. Ct., 775
P.2d 508, 510-11 (Cal. 1989); Miller v. Ortman, 136 N.E.2d 17, 33 (Ill. 1956);
Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A.2d 106, 109-10 (Me. 1972); Green v. Davies, 75 N.E.
536, 537 (N.Y. 1905); Worrie v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 198 (Va. 1956); Smith v.
Christopherson, 64 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Wis. 1954); see also Browning v. Blair, 218
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may be generally stated as: (1) two or more persons; (2) an unlawful
object or a lawful object to be accomplished by unlawful means; (3) an
agreement or meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4)
one or more wrongful acts; and (5) damage resulting therefrom. 28
Moreover, just as in the criminal context, the defendant must not only
intend to enter into an agreement, but also know of and intend to aid
in accomplishing the underlying objective. 29
The difference between criminal and civil conspiracy has been
summarized as follows: "The gist of the crime of conspiracy is the
agreement to commit the unlawful act whereas the gist of the tort is
the damage resulting to the plaintiff from an overt act or acts commit-
ted pursuant to the common design."30 This statement, albeit pithy, is
technically inaccurate: although there is a "crime of conspiracy," in
most jurisdictions there is no corresponding "tort" of conspiracy. 3 1
P.2d 233, 239 (Kan. 1950) ("The words fraud and conspiracy alone, no matter how
often repeated in a pleading, cannot make a case for the interference of a court of
equity until connected with some specific act for which one person is in law re-
sponsible to another; they have no more effect than other words of unpleasant
signification.").
28. See, e.g., Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d 47, 51 (10th Cir. 1963);
Doctors' Co., 775 P.2d at 510-11; Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, 270 P.2d
193, 196 (Colo. 1954); Bd. of Educ. of Asbury Park v. Hoek, 168 A.2d 829, 835
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1961).
29. People v. Beaumont Inv., Ltd., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (cit-
ing Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45, 51 (Cal. 1979)); see also Kidron v.
Movie Acquisition Corp., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("The
conspiring defendants must also have actual knowledge that a tort is planned
and concur in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose."); Tri-
plex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. 1995) ("[C]ivil con-
spiracy requires specific intent. For a civil conspiracy to arise, the parties must be
aware of the harm or wrongful conduct at the inception of the combination or
agreement.").
30. Michael R. v. Jeffrey B., 205 Cal. Rptr. 312, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); see 15A
C.J.S. Conspiracy § 100 (2004) ("The difference between civil and criminal con-
spiracy is that in a criminal conspiracy the agreement is the gravamen of the
offense, whereas in a civil action the gravamen of the tort is the damage resulting
to a plaintiff from an overt act done pursuant to a common design.").
31. Doctors' Co., 775 P.2d at 510 ("A civil conspiracy however atrocious, does not per
se give rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been committed resulting
in damage.") (quoting Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1074 (Cal.
1972)). A minority of jurisdictions have recognized the so-called "true conspir-
acy," also known as the "force of numbers" exception, i.e., the combination itself
makes unlawful a course of conduct that would not be unlawful if carried out by
an individual. E.g., Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Mass. 1939); see also
Leach, supra note 13, at 10 n.64 (citing at least eight states that recognize this
exception); Cooper, supra note 13, at 308 n.28 (discussing the exception). It has
been suggested that the "true conspiracy" category exists because courts have
overstated the rule in saying that conspiracy creates no liability absent an inde-
pendent tort; rather, the rule should be merely that civil conspiracy is not action-
able without damage, whether that damage be caused by the conspiracy itself or
some other act. Thus, in cases where the agreement itself causes harm, as with
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B. The "Non-Tort" of Civil Conspiracy
If civil conspiracy is not a tort, a question naturally arises: what is
it? Essentially, it is a theory of vicarious liability that renders each
participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all
damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he or
she was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his or her activ-
ity.3 2 The acts of any one co-conspirator are deemed the acts of all, so
anyone who merely agrees to the plan or design may be held liable for
the acts of the others even if they committed no overt act and gained
no benefit therefrom. 33 Thus, the benefit to the plaintiff in joining co-
conspirators is that it increases the pool of defendants from which the
plaintiff may recover. 3 4 As noted above, where the primary tortfeasor
is bankrupt, this can indeed be a useful tool.
Alleging a civil conspiracy offers other potential benefits to a plain-
tiff, as well. First, it provides an exception to the hearsay rule: an
admission of any co-conspirator is admissible against each of the
others. 35 Second, it may allow a plaintiff to support the court's exer-
cise of long-arm jurisdiction over non-resident alleged co-conspirators,
so long as the court has personal jurisdiction over at least one co-con-
spirator.3 6 Third, it may toll the applicable statute of limitations,
which in many jurisdictions begins to accrue from the last overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, rather than from the act that actually
caused the plaintiffs injury. 37
boycotts or concerted refusals to deal, the agreement itself can be a basis for tort
liability. Id.
32. E.g., Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 262 P. 302, 303 (Cal. 1927); Miller v. John, 70 N.E. 27,
29 (Ill. 1904); Cohen v. Nathaniel Fisher & Co., 120 N.Y.S. 546, 547 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1909); White v. White, 111 N.W. 1116, 1119 (Wis. 1907).
33. E.g., Mox, 262 P. at 303; Jackson v. Scott County Milling Co., 118 S.W.2d 1054,
1057 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Trebelhorn v. Bartlett, 154 Neb. 113, 117, 47 N.W.2d
374, 378 (1951).
34. See Trebelhorn, 154 Neb. at 117, 47 N.W.2d at 378; Bd. of Educ. of Asbury Park v.
Hoek, 168 A.2d 829, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1961); State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 175
S.E.2d 637, 645 (W. Va. 1970).
35. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); CAL. EVID. CODE §1223(a) (West 1995); MD. R. 5-
803(a)(5) (1996); N.J. R. EVID. 803(b)(5) (1994).
36. E.g., Gemini Enter. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 565 (M.D.N.C.
1979); see also generally Stuart M. Riback, The Long Arm and Multiple Defend-
ants: The Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 506
(1984) (discussing "conspiracy theory of jurisdiction" as independent basis for
courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over co-conspirators). But see, e.g., Mansour
v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("California does not
recognize conspiracy as a basis for acquiring personal jurisdiction over a party.");
Allen v. Columbia Fin. Mgmt., 377 S.E.2d 352, 357 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) ("We
decline to attribute the contacts of one alleged conspirator to another alleged
conspirator.").
37. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957) (finding the limita-
tion period runs from last overt act under federal criminal conspiracy statute); cf.
Black v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
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The evidentiary, jurisdictional, and limitations tolling benefits
may be characterized as the procedural features of civil conspiracy.
By contrast, the ability of a plaintiff to hold co-conspirators jointly lia-
ble for all damage caused by the primary tortfeasor may be called the
substantive feature of civil conspiracy, in that it goes directly to the
fundamental question of when one party should bear responsibility for
the damage caused by another party's tortious acts. It is this substan-
tive feature of civil conspiracy that is the focus of this Article.
C. The Reason for the Non-Tort Character of Civil
Conspiracy
To understand why conspiracy is not an independent tort, we first
look to why conspiracy is an independent crime. In the criminal con-
text, two related reasons are given for making conspiracy a separately
punishable offense. The first is that conspiracy allows police interven-
tion at an earlier point than is permitted under the law of attempt.38
But early intervention alone would not explain why conspiracy does
not merge into the underlying offense even where that offense has
been completed, while attempt charges do merge. 39 This leads to the
second reason for punishing conspiracy separately, which is the
"group danger" rationale: "two people united to commit a crime are
more dangerous than one or both of them separately planning to com-
mit the same offense."40 The co-conspirators acting in concert are
thought to enjoy increased efficiency and division of labor, to share
knowledge, to exert pressure on each other not to withdraw, and to
provide mutual encouragement and support; moreover, their combina-
tion makes possible the execution of more complex criminal acts than
(holding plaintiffs claim would not be time-barred if he could show overt acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitations period, but plaintiffs allega-
tions did not state a claim for conspiracy). Some scholars have suggested that a
plaintiff should also be able to use civil conspiracy allegations as a means of per-
suading the jury of the outrageous nature of the defendants' conduct. See gener-
ally Leach, supra note 13.
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. 1 (1985); People v. Morante, 975 P.2d 1071, 1080
(Cal. 1999).
39. See Commonwealth v. Cook, 411 N.E.2d 1326, 1332 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) ("It
is established law that conspiracy to commit an offense and the subsequent com-
mission of the crime normally do not merge into a single punishable act. The
necessity of proving a separate agreement underlies the merger rule .. . .") (cita-
tions omitted); see also Sarah N. Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal
Conspiracy Law, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1155, 1180 (1982) (citing Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)).
40. JOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 29.02(B) at 425 (3d ed.
2001); Morante, 975 P.2d at 1080 n.5.
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might otherwise occur, and makes more likely the commission of
crimes unrelated to conspiracy's original purpose.4 1
Based on the twin rationales of early prevention and group danger,
it is clear that the touchstone of criminal conspiracy is the increased
risk of social harm resulting from the combination of actors. But there
is also an increased risk of harm where the object of the conspiracy is
a tort rather than a crime. Given that the tort system seeks to deter
socially undesirable conduct, this suggests that the tort system should
also proscribe conspiracy independently of the underlying tort.4 2
The difference in treatment between the criminal and civil systems
derives from tort's focus on compensation for harm suffered. Unlike
the criminal system, which prohibits acts that endanger the general
safety and welfare,43 the civil tort system does not operate to deter
socially dangerous conduct generally. Rather, it promotes deterrence
only when it simultaneously promotes compensation to an identifiable
individual.44 Indeed, the deterrent effect of the tort system is not "ac-
tivated" until a plaintiff has been injured and chooses to avail him or
herself of its remedies. Because the tort system does not proscribe
"attempted" torts that do not result in harm,45 a fortiori it would not
proscribe the agreement to make the attempt, which is at an earlier
stage of development of the tort than the attempt itself.
41. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961); Welling, supra note 39,
at 1180-81. It should be noted that the justifications for the group danger ratio-
nale for punishing conspiracy criminally "have never been proved empirically,
and there is substantial disagreement regarding their validity." Id. at 1181.
42. See generally Leach, supra note 13 (arguing that in certain circumstances, con-
spiracy doctrine should be used to target inchoate torts).
43. United States v. Barner, 195 F. Supp. 103, 105 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
44. Crum v. City of Stockton, 157 Cal. Rptr. 823, 824 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (noting
that "damages [are] an essential element of any tort"); Leach, supra note 13, at 4
("[Tiraditional tort suits cannot prevent the initial damage, but only, by means of
the imposition of substantial compensatory and punitive damages, warn the
tortfeasor of the potential costs of such tortious actions in the future."); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) ("[Tlhe purposes for which actions
of tort are maintainable [are]: (a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution
for harms; (b) to determine rights; (c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful
conduct; and (d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful
self-help."); Simeon M. Kriesberg, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Cor-
porate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091, 1096 (1976) ("[A]lthough both criminal and civil
law are concerned with deterring undesirable conduct, only the latter is also con-
cerned with compensating injured parties.").
45. Of course, an attempt to commit one tort could constitute another tort. As an
obvious example, if one attempts a battery upon another but no physical touching
ensues, the defendant could still be liable for assault if the victim was put in
apprehension of immediate harm. E.g., Bergman by Harre v. Anderson, 226 Neb.
333, 339, 411 N.W.2d 336, 336 (1987). This is not a relaxation of the damage
requirement; it is merely a recognition that being put in fear of immediate bodily
harm is itself a compensable form of injury.
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Thus, civil conspiracy is not an independent tort because consider-
ations that are specific to conspiracy, i.e., early prevention and group
danger, have been subordinated to general tort norms, i.e., the re-
quirement of damages and focus on compensation of specific victims.
D. Consequences of the Non-Tort Character of Civil
Conspiracy: The Underlying Duty Requirement
This subordination of conspiracy doctrine in the tort context has
further manifested itself in the oft-stated rule that a plaintiff cannot
use conspiracy allegations to hold a defendant liable for a tort he or
she would otherwise be legally incapable of committing.46 One way in
which a defendant would be legally incapable of committing a tort is if
he or she does not owe the duty upon which the violation of the tort is
premised.47 For example, if the defendant does not owe the plaintiff a
fiduciary duty, the defendant cannot be held liable for conspiring with
a third party to breach that party's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.48
This limitation on civil conspiracy liability is referred to herein as the
"underlying duty requirement."
1. Criticism of the Underlying Duty Requirement
Not all courts apply the underlying duty requirement to civil con-
spiracy claims, 49 and the requirement is not without its criticisms. Al-
though the underlying duty requirement is articulated as a corollary
of the rule that civil conspiracy is not an independent tort,50 the one
does not necessarily follow from the other. The reason that civil con-
spiracy is not an independent tort is that conspiracy-specific consider-
46. E.g., BEP, Inc. v. Atkinson, 174 F. Supp. 2d 400, 409 (D. Md. 2001); Allied Supply
Co. v. Brown 585 So. 2d 33, 36 (Ala. 1991); Doctors' Co. v. Super. Ct., 775 P.2d
508, 511 (Cal. 1989); First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Hart, 363 S.E.2d 832, 833 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1987).
47. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 457 (Cal.
1994) ("By its nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy presupposes that the
coconspirator is legally capable of committing the tort., i.e., that he or she owes a
duty to plaintiff recognized by law and is potentially subject to liability for breach
of that duty.").
48. E.g., BEP, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 409; Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp., 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 752, 768-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
49. E.g., DeBoer Structures, Inc. v. Shaffer Tent & Awning Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d 934,
945-46 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding non-fiduciary liable for conspiracy to breach
fiduciary duty, the court said "[t]he civil conspiracy claim does not.., require the
existence of a duty on the part of the alleged co-conspirator"). Cf. Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530 (1992) (holding that claim for conspiracy to
misrepresent or conceal facts concerning smoking hazards was not preempted by
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334, because the
"predicate duty underlying this claim is a duty not to conspire to commit fraud")
(emphasis added).
50. See, e.g.,Applied Equip. 869 P.2d at 459 ("Conspiracy is not an independent tort;
it cannot create a duty or abrogate an immunity.").
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ations (group danger) have been subordinated to the general priorities
of civil tort law (compensation). But the civil tort system's focus on
compensation cannot alone justify the underlying duty requirement.
The systemic insistence that there be harm to an identifiable plaintiff
explains why a completed tort must exist before liability can be im-
posed upon co-conspirators. It does not explain why the co-conspira-
tors need to have been legally capable of committing that tort.5 1
Courts holding that a conspiracy defendant must owe the duty vio-
lated by the underlying tort are implicitly deciding that there is no
general tort duty to avoid conspiring. 52 But the question is, should
there be a duty not to conspire? The normal rule in tort law is that
liability follows fault.5 3 The concept of "fault" can refer to a culpable
state of mind, to causation of injury, or to both.54 Holding co-conspira-
tors civilly liable is justified, if at all, only if they are culpable and/or
have contributed to the harm that results from acts taken pursuant to
the conspiracy.
Neither a co-conspirator's culpability nor the increased risk of
harm caused by his or her entering into a combination is related to
whether the co-conspirator owes the underlying duty. Take the exam-
ple of a non-fiduciary who conspires with a fiduciary to breach the lat-
ter's fiduciary duty. The non-fiduciary co-conspirator is no less
culpable because the duty he agrees to help someone else violate is a
fiduciary one (as opposed to a duty that everyone owes). Indeed, if
anything, the co-conspirator may be more culpable in this situation
because he knows he is helping the primary wrongdoer violate a posi-
tion of trust, and not merely an obligation incurred at arm's length or
vis-A-vis a total stranger.
There is also an increased risk of harm from the non-fiduciary's
combination with a fiduciary. Although the risk that the non-fiduci-
ary will breach his fiduciary duty to the third party is no greater than
it would have been had the co-conspirators acted independently-it is
51. See, e.g., DeBoer Structures, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 945-46 (rejecting the underlying
duty requirement, the court said "[t]here must simply be evidence of a common
understanding or design to commit an unlawful act").
52. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 Hv. L. REV. 1222, 1239 (1931) (arguing that judges make, not find,
the law). Cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530 (acknowledging a "duty not to conspire to
commit fraud").
53. Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). Cf.
David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for Trade-
mark Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 65 (1998) ("Strict liability is a departure
from the normal tort rule that liability follows fault.").
54. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. M/V Morgan, 248 F. Supp. 2d 759, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(examining whether "the 'fault' that is to be apportioned or compared [is] culpa-
bility only or causation as well"); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 660
N.Y.S.2d 803, 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) ("In CPLR § 1411, dealing with compara-
tive fault, the statute refers to 'culpable conduct which caused the damages.'").
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non-existent in either event, because the non-fiduciary is legally inca-
pable of breaching such a duty-that is not the only potential risk.
The influence that the non-fiduciary exerts on the fiduciary, in terms
of moral support, technical knowledge, or pressure against with-
drawal, 55 could make it more likely that the fiduciary will breach his
or her duty, thus making the combination more dangerous than the
two acting independently.
One could even argue that the fact that conspiracy is not an inde-
pendent tort counsels against the underlying duty requirement, not in
favor of it. Because conspiracy is not an independent tort, a prerequi-
site to recovery by a plaintiff against co-conspirators is that the plain-
tiff prove each of the elements of a tort-typically, duty, breach,
causation, and damages56-against at least one direct tortfeasor with
whom they conspired. 5 7 The plaintiff is not required, however, to
prove that the co-conspirators breached a duty; nor is the plaintiff re-
quired to show that they caused the plaintiff's damages. All that need
be proven against the co-conspirator is that he entered into an agree-
ment to pursue the tort. But duty is not an element of an agreement,
so what does it have to do with conspiracy liability? To put it another
way, if breach, causation, and damage need not be established as to
co-conspirators, why does duty?
2. A Possible Defense of the Underlying Duty Requirement
Perhaps the underlying duty requirement exists precisely because
so little else needs to be proved against co-conspirators. After all, if
the defendant not only owes the duty but also breaches that duty, he
can be held liable directly in tort;5 8 under these circumstances, con-
spiracy doctrine becomes superfluous 5 9-at least as to that defendant,
55. See Welling, supra note 39, at 1180 (discussing mechanisms of increased group
danger of conspiracy).
56. See Zaven T. Saroyan, The Current Injustice of the Loss of Chance Doctrine: An
Argument for a New Approach to Damages, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 15, 17 (2003) ("It is
widely understood that tort theory incorporates four main elements: 1) duty; 2)
breach of duty; 3) causation (both legal and factual); and 4) damages.").
57. E.g., Earp v. City of Detroit, 167 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) ("There is
no civil action for conspiracy alone. It must be coupled with the commission of
acts which damaged the plaintiff. Recovery may be had from parties on the the-
ory of concerted action as long as the elements of the separate and actionable tort
are properly proved.").
58. See, e.g., Doctors' Co. v. Super. Ct., 775 P.2d 508, 513 (Cal. 1989) ("[C]orporate
directors and officers who directly order, authorize or participate in the corpora-
tion's tortious conduct ... may be held liable, as conspirators or otherwise, for
violation of their own duties towards persons injured by the corporate tort.") (em-
phasis added).
59. E.g., Barkett v. Brucato, 264 P.2d 978, 986 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) ("[Tlhe allega-
tions of conspiracy are mere surplusage in a case where the conspiracy itself is
unproved but there is evidence of actionable conduct on the part of one defendant.
Such conduct is actionable, regardless of the conspiracy . . ").
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and at least for substantive purposes. 6 0 A plaintiff only needs conspir-
acy theory to hold a defendant liable either where the defendant has
agreed to accomplish a tort without providing any further assistance
to the tortfeasor, or has provided assistance that is not itself indepen-
dently tortious.6 1 Agreeing to assist someone or providing non-tor-
tious assistance to them is a low threshold of conduct, and the conduct
of an innocent actor could resemble that of a culpable co-conspirator. 6 2
Accordingly, courts view conspiracy with a wary eye. 63
It is, of course, the defendant's wrongful intent to achieve the ob-
ject of the combination that distinguishes an unwitting accomplice
from the knowing partner in crime (or, more accurately in the civil
context, "partner in tort"). But every conspiracy defendant will de-
clare his innocence, leaving the judge (or jury) to rely on circumstan-
tial evidence of intent. 64 Perhaps courts, recognizing that lack of duty
is a "cleaner" basis for denying civil conspiracy liability than lack of
intent (in that it is more amenable to resolution as a matter of law),
use the underlying duty requirement as a means of reining in what
they see as a dangerously nebulous doctrine. 6 5 In other words, per-
haps they are more concerned with preventing false positives (non-
culpable actors being held liable) than false negatives (culpable actors
60. The plaintiff may nevertheless choose to allege a conspiracy for procedural rea-
sons-such as to avoid the statute of limitations, to hold still other co-conspira-
tors jointly and severally liable, or for jury appeal-see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text-but the plaintiff does not substantively need conspiracy the-
ory in order to hold the defendant liable for the damage caused by the tortfeasor.
61. A plaintiff could also sue for aiding and abetting where the defendant knew of the
primary wrongdoer's tortious conduct, and provided substantial assistance to the
wrongdoer. E.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Tech-
nically, then, a plaintiff only needs conspiracy allegations where he cannot show
that the assistance given by the defendant amounted to "substantial assistance."
62. See Egan v. Unites States, 137 F.2d 369, 378 (8th Cir. 1943) ("The line that sepa-
rates mere knowledge of and acquiescence in a conspiracy from participation and
active cooperation is often vague and difficult to determine."); Jacqueline R.
Mijuskovic, Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd.: Eliminating
Tort Damages from Contract Actions, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 561, 567 (1996) ("There is
nothing inherently wrong with agreeing and planning to take a particular course
of action.").
63. See Krulewitch v. United States 336 U.S. 440, 449 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he looseness and pliability of the doctrine present inherent dangers
which should be in the background of judicial thought wherever it is sought to
extend the doctrine to meet the exigencies of a particular case."); Developments in
the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 922 (1959) (noting that flexibil-
ity and formlessness of conspiracy law have evoked widespread criticism from
judicial and academic commentators).
64. See Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 685 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding specific
intent element of civil conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence).
65. See United States v. Kaiser, 179 F. Supp. 545, 549 (S.D. Ill. 1960) ("It may be said
that conspiracy is a nebulous offense but even nebulae must admit of some limi-
tations. If the conspiracy statute is to be applied to cases of this nature, the appli-
cation should be effected by congressional action, not by judicial legislation.").
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being immunized), so they apply a requirement that increases the
likelihood of the latter in order to reduce the former.
To be clear, this is an exercise in speculation: if limiting the use of
the conspiracy doctrine in the civil context is the courts' motivation for
applying the underling duty requirement, they do not say so explicitly.
Nor would this motivation justify applying the underlying duty re-
quirement to civil conspiracy claims, as opposed to, for example, re-
quiring civil conspiracy plaintiffs to meet a higher evidentiary
threshold of intent.
3. A Better Defense of the Underlying Duty Requirement
Not surprisingly, the justification for the underlying duty require-
ment will not be found in the policies behind conspiracy doctrine, since
the requirement directly undercuts the conspiracy-based policy of de-
terring and punishing all culpable actors. Rather, the requirement is
defensible on the ground that it prevents plaintiffs from circum-
venting the policies of other torts.
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd.66 illustrates
the point. In Applied Equipment, the California Supreme Court held
that a breaching party could not be liable to the other contracting
party for conspiring to interfere with its own contract. 6 7 In consider-
ing this issue, the court first considered whether a party could be held
liable in tort for interfering with its own contract. The court answered
this preliminary question in the negative, relying heavily upon the
theory of efficient breach.68
Under the efficient breach theory, if one party can breach its con-
tract, compensate the other party, and still make a profit-for exam-
ple, by contracting with a third party who can supply product to the
breaching party at a sufficiently lower price-the breach is efficient 69
and should not be deterred. 70 An obligation to perform a contract is
66. 869 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1994).
67. Id. at 509.
68. See Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the Doctrine
of Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion of Contract Breacher as Wrongdoer,
47 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 646 (1999).
69. "Efficiency" is used here to mean "Pareto superior." "One state is Pareto superior
to a second state when at least one person is better off in the first state relative to
the second state, and no one is worse off." Id. at 648 n.7. The implicit assump-
tion, of course, is that expectancy damages make the obligee "whole," and thus
that he is not made worse off by the breach than he would have been by perform-
ance. This assumption is not always taken for granted by scholars. Id. (arguing
that there should be a limited and defined class of wrongful breaches, which
would include situations wherein the plaintiff suffers detriment not compensated
by traditional contract damages).
70. Mijuskovic, supra note 62, at 587.
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thus seen as an option to perform or pay damages.71 But a con-
tracting party must know how much it would pay in the event of a
breach in order to efficiently decide whether to perform or breach and
pay damages. 72 As opposed to tort damages, which compensate the
victim for all damages proximately caused by the tortfeasor's acts re-
gardless of whether they were anticipated, 73 contract damages are
limited to those that are within the reasonable contemplation of the
contracting parties at the time the contract is entered into. 74 Moreo-
ver, because a breach of contract is not seen as a "wrong" to be de-
terred, the motive of a breaching party is irrelevant and has no impact
on the scope of damages that the plaintiff may recover. 75 In tort, how-
ever, motive does matter: a malicious intent in committing an act may
give rise to punitive damages that otherwise would not have been
available.76
The Applied Equipment court noted that imposing tort liability on
a contracting party for violating a contractual duty would "under-
mine[ ] the policies which have ... limited contractual liability"-i.e.,
the policies that promote efficient breaches.77 The court thus held
that a contracting party does not owe a tort duty not to interfere with
its own contract. Accordingly, it also held that the plaintiff could not
sue the breaching party for conspiracy to interfere with its contract, as
71. Remington, supra note 68, at 647; see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the
Law, 10 Hav. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and
nothing else.").
72. See Mijuskovic, supra note 62, at 587 ("[T]he doctrine can only work if the breach-
ing party is held liable solely for foreseeable damages. Otherwise, the breaching
party would be unable to appraise the costs of its actions because of the threat of
uncertain tort liability.").
73. Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1994).
74. See Mijuskovic, supra note 62, at 587 ("[A] rule of law is efficient when it reveals
the full costs of a decision to the party who makes the decision.") (quoting Lewis
A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies,
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 705 (1986)).
75. E.g., Battista v. Leb. Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 117 (6th Cir. 1976).
76. Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 461. This distinction loomed large in Applied Equip-
ment: at trial, the jury had assessed defendant Litton with $12.5 million in puni-
tive damages on the conspiracy claim, although the alleged contract damages
were about $100,000. Id. at 456.
77. Id. at 461 (quoting Cooper, supra note 13, at 328); see also id. ("In economic
terms, the impact is identical-plaintiff has lost the benefit of a bargain and is
entitled to recover compensation in the form of contract damages. In ethical
terms, the mere entry of a stranger onto the scene does not render the contracting
party's breach more socially or morally reprehensible"); id. at 463 ("[The griev-
ance of the plaintiff is, in essence, breach of contract; and... to allow the plaintiff
to sue under the tort theory of wrongful interference with contractual rights
would not only be superfluous, but would also enable him to recover tort damages
(e.g., punitive damages, damages for mental suffering) to which he is not entitled
under California law.") (quoting Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 135 Cal. Rptr.
720, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis omitted)).
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this would "accomplish an 'end run"' around limitations on contract
liability. 78 In other words, unless the scope of conspiracy liability
tracked the scope of liability for the underlying tort of interference
with contract, a plaintiff, by including a conspiracy claim in the com-
plaint, could circumvent important restrictions on the underlying tort
and upset the balance of economic incentives that had been struck.
Seen in this light, the underlying duty requirement is not an in-
strument of injustice denying plaintiffs the ability to pursue liability
against culpable parties. Rather, it is an instrument of maintaining
the status quo regarding whatever liability otherwise exists. For ex-
ample, in Younan v. Equifax, Inc.,79 non-fiduciaries were held incapa-
ble of conspiring to commit fraudulent concealment, because only
fiduciaries owe a duty of disclosure; s 0 but they could be liable for con-
spiracy to commit actual fraud, because everyone owes a duty not to
injure another through affirmative misrepresentations. 8 1 This dis-
tinction regarding the claims for which a co-conspirator can or cannot
be held liable may seem artificial. But it is no more or less artificial
than the line separating who can or cannot be sued directly for fraudu-
lent concealment as opposed to actual fraud. The underlying duty re-
quirement merely preserved the substantive policy that only those in
a fiduciary or confidential relation to the plaintiff can be held liable for
nondisclosure.S2
The underlying duty requirement should have limited applicabil-
ity: the requirement only bars liability where the co-conspirator does
not owe the duty violated by the primary wrongdoer's act. But people
have a duty to refrain from committing many torts: "Every person is
bound without contract to abstain from injuring the person or prop-
erty of another, or infringing upon any of his rights."8 3 Thus, virtually
anyone could be liable for conspiracy to commit fraud, invasion of pri-
78. Id. at 463; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1997) (punitive damages not recover-
able except in actions for breach of obligations "not arising from contract").
79. 169 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
80. Id. at 489.
81. Id. at 486 ("A cause of action for conspiracy will lie against agents and employees
of insurers even though the former are not parties to the agreement of insurance
when they join the insurer in a conspiracy to defraud the insured."). Further,
"[tihe law imposes the obligation that every person is bound without contract to
abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of
his rights." Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708 (West 1998) (same).
82. E.g., Frye v. Am. Gen. Fin., 307 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842 (S.D. Miss. 2004) ("The
plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent and negligent 'omissions' are . . . dependent on
the existence of a fiduciary or other confidential relationship."); Debra A. Winiar-
ski, Defenses and Suits by Accountants, CA66 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 167, 171-72 (1996)
("The defendant's silence is usually not deemed fraudulent, however, unless the
relationship of the parties imposes a duty upon the defendant to make disclosure.
This latter relationship might be imposed in certain accountant-client relation-
ships, especially those in which a fiduciary duty exists.").
83. Younan, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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vacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, false impris-
onment, trespass, and conversion. Indeed, in Doctors' Co. v. Superior
Court,84 one of the earlier cases to articulate the underlying duty re-
quirement, the court observed that the applicability of the underlying
duty requirement would be "relatively narrow where the violated duty
is other than contractual."8 5 The court in Doctors' Co., in holding that
agents and employees of an insurer could not be held liable for con-
spiring to violate the insurer's statutory duty to attempt a good faith
settlement, noted that that statute in question was "somewhat unu-
sual in that [its] application is expressly restricted to 'persons engaged
in the business of insurance,"'8 6 and that most statutory duties are
imposed upon "any person."87
The duties which are imposed only on a limited class of persons
include the following: the duty not to breach a contract, imposed only
upon contracting parties who voluntarily assume such duties;8 8 the
tort duty not to interfere with or induce a breach of a contract, im-
posed only upon non-contracting parties;8 9 certain statutory duties
which expressly apply to specific classes of persons;9 0 and fiduciary
duties, including the duty of disclosure, owed only by fiduciaries.9 1
One could surely think of other specific examples. The point, however,
is that in each of these cases, a decision was made by private parties
(in the case of contract duties), courts (in the case of common law du-
ties), or the legislature (in the case of statutory duties) that only cer-
tain classes of persons would owe the particular duty. The underlying
duty requirement in civil conspiracy law preserves those decisions.
84. 775 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1989).
85. Id. at 514.
86. Id. (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 790.01 (West 1993)).
87. Id. (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940(f, 12955(g) (West 2004); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25189, 25189.2 (West 1992) (each proscribing conduct by "any
person")).
88. This duty also includes the duty imposed by law upon all contracting parties to
act in good faith in performance of the contract. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
510 P.2d 1032, 1038-39 (Cal. 1973) ("[T]he non-insurer defendants were not par-
ties to the agreements for insurance; therefore, they are not, as such, subject to
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing."). California is unusual in that
violation of this duty may give rise to tort damages against a limited class of
contracting parties, i.e., insurance companies. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
765 P.2d 373, 390 (Cal. 1988).
89. E.g., Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal.
1994) ("The tort duty not to interfere with the contract falls only on strangers-
interlopers who have no legitimate interest in the scope or course of the contract's
performance.").
90. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 790.01 (West 1993) (imposing duty to attempt good faith
settlement only upon "persons engaged in the business of insurance"); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 2943(a)(1) (West 1993) (imposing duty to provide payoff demand state-
ment only upon a "beneficiary of a mortgage or deed of trust, or his or her
assignees").
91. See supra note 82.
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The fact that conspiracy is not an independent tort does not have
great practical impact in most cases-most defendants can be sued for
most torts, and so they can be sued for conspiring to commit most
torts. Thus, although the underlying duty requirement undercuts the
conspiracy policies of punishing culpable actors and deterring danger-
ous combinations, it does so only when these policies are in conflict
with the policy of limiting the class of persons who can be sued for the
underlying tort. Unfortunately, as will be seen in the next section,
although the agent's immunity rule is derived from limitations on con-
spiracy doctrine that also promote underlying tort policies, the rule
itself has gone adrift from its moorings.
III. THE AGENT'S IMMUNITY RULE: AN OVERBROAD
DEFENSE TO CIVIL CONSPIRACY
Conspiracy is a notoriously nebulous doctrine.9 2 Whatever con-
cerns courts may have about a plaintiff using conspiracy allegations to
snare innocent actors who unwittingly cooperated with a tortfeasor,
those concerns are likely heightened when the alleged co-conspirator
is an agent or employee of the tortfeasor. Conspiracy imposes liability
upon people acting in concert-precisely what agents are supposed to
do with their principals. When an agent combines with one or more
persons to commit a tort while acting as an agent for a principal, how
should courts determine whether the agent was a culpable actor or
was instead simply doing his or her job?
One way that courts limit agents' exposure to tort liability is by
holding that duly acting agents and employees are legally incapable of
conspiring with their principals.9 3 The agent loses this immunity
when he or she acts, not to benefit the principal, but for his or her own
personal gain.9 4 Courts have also ruled that the gain must be more
92. See supra note 65.
93. See, e.g., Elliott v. Tilton, 89 F.3d 260, 265 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding duly acting
agents legally incapable of conspiring with their corporation for civil conspiracy
purposes); Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 458 (same); Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 662 P.2d 610, 622 (Nev. 1983) (same); see also Macke Laundry Serv.
Ltd. P'ship v. Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("[Tlhe
general rule [is] that wrongs which are attributed to an attorney as the client's
agent do not support a conspiracy.").
94. See Elliott, 89 F.3d at 264-65 (upholding dismissal of claim for civil conspiracy to
commit fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, where plaintiff prof-
fered no evidence that the co-conspirators "were acting for their own personal
financial gain rather than for the benefit of the corporation"); Macke Laundry,
931 S.W.2d at 176 ("[A]n agent can be liable for conspiracy with the principal if
the agent acts out of a self-interest which goes beyond the agency relationship.");
Collins, 662 P.2d at 622 ("Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire
with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capaci-
ties on behalf of the corporation and not as individuals for their individual
advantage.").
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than the ordinary fees the agent or employee gets for rendering his or
her services; 95 otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule.9 6
California courts refer to this principle of immunity as the "agent's
immunity rule."9 7 A number of other jurisdictions apply this same
doctrine, although they do not use the convenient label. 98 Ironically,
the term "agent's immunity rule" was first used in Applied Equip-
ment, an opinion that did not decide issues of agent liability at all.
Applied Equipment addressed whether contracting parties could be
held liable in tort for conspiring to interfere with their own con-
tracts.9 9 In holding that they could not, Applied Equipment overruled
an earlier lower court decision, Wise v. Southern Pacific Co.,100 to the
extent that it held to the contrary.10 1 But in doing so, the California
Supreme Court explained that Wise was still good law to the extent it
held that duly acting agents could not conspire with their princi-
pals. 102 Because Wise is the source from which the agent's immunity
rule "emanates,"1 0 3 according to Applied Equipment, it is worth a brief
examination.
In Wise, the plaintiff brought a claim for breach of employment
agreement against his former employer, and a separate claim for con-
spiracy to cause the breach against the employer and various of its
employees and agents. 104 The court held that the employer could be
held liable for conspiring with another entity to breach its own em-
ployment contract. 105 However, the court sustained the demurrers of
the agents and employees to the conspiracy claim, reasoning that:
95. See In re County of Orange, 203 B.R. 983,999-1000 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996), rev'd
on other grounds, 245 B.R. 138 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) ("[T]he gain must be more
than the fees received from the fiduciary-defendant that the nonfiduciary is ac-
cused of conspiring with."); Cooper v. Equity Gen. Ins. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 692,
696-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that contingency fee agreement did not con-
stitute personal stake for purposes of exception to agent's immunity rule where
plaintiff did not allege that "Seligson stood to gain anything more than a fee for
his work as an attorney").
96. See In re County of Orange, 203 B.R. at 1000 n. 19 (noting that allowing ordinary
fees to satisfy the personal gain exception "would destroy [the agent's immunity
rule] since virtually all agents or employees of a defendant-fiduciary who is being
sued for breach of its fiduciary duty would have received some form of compensa-
tion from the fiduciary. The harmed party would always be able to assert the
exception to find the agent or employee liable for conspiracy.").
97. Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 458.
98. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 93.
99. See supra notes 67-68, 77-78 and accompanying text.
100. 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
101. Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 457.
102. Id. at 458 & n.4.
103. Id. at n.4.
104. Wise, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 654 & n.2.
105. Id. at 664-65. In addition to suing his employer, the Southern Pacific Company,
and its agents and employees, the plaintiff also sued the Association of American
Railroads and certain of its employees, agents, and representatives. See id. at
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Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate
principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of
the corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage. This
rule derives from the principle that ordinarily corporate agents and employees
acting for and on behalf of the corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a
breach of the corporation's contract since being in a confidential relationship
to the corporation their action in this respect is privileged. 10 6
Applied Equipment relied on this language to support a monolithic
"agent's immunity rule" that, as phrased, would apply to civil conspir-
acy claims for any tort: "duly acting agents and employees cannot be
held liable for conspiring with their own principals (the 'agent's immu-
nity rule')."1o7 But the holding in Wise actually encompasses two re-
lated but distinct principles-the agent's privilege theory and the
single legal actor theory-neither of which supports a rule that immu-
nizes agents from civil conspiracy claims generally.
A. The Agent's Privilege Theory
1. Propriety of the Agent's Privilege as a Defense to Interference
Claims
The agent's privilege theory developed, in California as elsewhere,
in the context of claims against agents or employees for interfering
with or inducing a breach of their principal's contract. 0 8 All jurisdic-
tions provide that an inducement of breach of another's contract
achieved by unlawful means, such as slander, fraud, or physical vio-
lence, is unlawful.10 9 Where the means of inducing a breach of con-
tract are not themselves unlawful, the general rule is that an action
will nevertheless lie where the inducement is unjustified or un-
privileged. 1 10 Whether there is a privilege or justification may depend
on, among other things, the relationship between the parties and a
balancing of the defendant's interests in inducing the breach and the
654 n.2. The court did not state whether there was a contractual employment
relationship between plaintiff and the Association. (The employment agreement
was a collective bargaining agreement, so the Association may have been in priv-
ity with the plaintiff and/or his union.) In holding that employees could not be
held liable for conspiring with their corporate principals, the court did not ad-
dress why an employee of the Association-which (as opposed to an employee of
Southern Pacific itself) could be liable for conspiring with the Southern Pacific
Company, see id. at 667-should be immune.
106. Wise, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (citations omitted).
107. Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 458.
108. See, e.g., Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1941); May v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 370 P.2d 390 (Kan. 1962).
109. Imperial Ice Co., 112 P.2d at 632.
110. E.g., Lawless v. Bhd. of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of Am., 300 P.2d
159, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); May, 370 P.2d at 395 ("While it is true that an
action will lie for unjustifiably inducing a breach of contract by a party thereto,
the inducement must be wrongful and not privileged.").
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plaintiffs interest in maintaining his or her expectancy under the
contract. 111
As stated in Wise, agents have a privilege to induce a breach of
their principals' contracts under the rationale that "being in a confi-
dential relationship to the corporation their action in this respect is
privileged." 1' 2 Although Wise itself failed to define this "confidential
relationship,"'13 it was undoubtedly referring to the fact that an agent
is a fiduciary of his or her principal.114 Assuming that giving advice or
making a decision to breach a contract is within the scope of agency,
the agent is duty-bound to give such advice or make such decision.115
In fact, for many agents and employees-including attorneys, busi-
ness managers, or chief financial officers-advising the principal
whether to enter or breach contracts is not only within the scope of
their agency, it is the very raison d'tre of their agency.
The duly acting agent's conduct in inducing a breach is "privileged"
because the principal's purpose for having the agent would be frus-
trated if the agent-principal relationship was not valued more than
the obligee's interest in the contract's performance. Under the effi-
cient breach theory, the law promotes contracting parties making
well-informed decisions about when and whether to breach by limiting
111. See Imperial Ice Co., 112 P.2d at 632; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 767 (1939)
(listing among factors to consider in determining privilege to induce breach: "the
relations between the parties"; "the interest sought to be advanced by the actor";
and "the social interests in protecting the expectancy on the one hand and the
actor's freedom of action on the other hand").
112. Wise v. S. Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
113. Wise cited three cases for this proposition-May, Lawless, and Imperial Ice Co.
See Wise, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 665. May merely restated the proposition that the
"confidential relationship" created a "privilege," citing to Lawless. May, 370 P.2d
at 395. Lawless, in turn, cited to Imperial Ice Co. Lawless, 300 P.2d at 162. Im-
perial Ice Co. referenced the supposed holding in Boyson v. Thorn, 33 P. 492 (Cal.
1893), that "the confidential relationship [that] existed between the manager of
the hotel and the owner justified the manager in advising the owner to violate his
contract with plaintiffs." Imperial Ice Co., 112 P.2d at 634 (the phrase "confiden-
tial relationship" was Imperial Ice Co.'s, not Boyson's). Although Boyson has been
relied upon for the rule that a servant may induce his master to breach a contract
with a third person (see Lawless, 300 P.2d at 162; see also May, 370 P.2d at 395
(citing Lawless); Mallard v. Boring, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)
(same)), it considered only whether the contractual relationship that was dis-
rupted was one between master and servant, not whether the third party dis-
rupting it was privileged to do so because he was a servant of a contracting party.
Boyson, 33 P. at 493. Wise thus leads one to a precedential dead end.
114. See Gerhardt v. Weiss, 55 Cal. Rptr. 425, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) ("An agent is
classified by the law as a fiduciary and holds a confidential relationship to his
principal."); see also supra note 5.
115. E.g., Rianda v. San Benito Title Guar. Co., 217 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. 1950) ("It is the
duty of an agent to obey the instructions of his principal . . ").
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damages for a breach to expectancy damages. 1 16 Agents help con-
tracting parties gather information and make such decisions. Thus,
although the agent's privilege protects agents from liability for induc-
ing a breach, its ultimate purpose is to protect the interests of the
contracting party, i.e., the principal. 117
That the agent's privilege serves to benefit the principal is demon-
strated by considering the consequences of the absence of such a privi-
lege: if agents were to absorb the cost of tort liability for inducing a
breach of their principals' contracts-or, more accurately, if they in-
ternalized the risk of such liability ex ante-they might be deterred
from giving candid advice (or, indeed, giving advice at all) regarding
whether or not to breach. They might also be deterred from ulti-
mately "pulling the trigger" in ordering or executing a breach. Indeed,
particularly for corporate principals, which cannot act but through
their agents,' 1 8 the individuals who would effectuate the corporation's
breach are the ones whose actions would be chilled. If, conversely, the
principal internalizes the actual or potential cost of the tort liability
imposed on the agents-and it is well known that employers often in-
demnify employees or agents for liability incurred for authorized acts
undertaken in good faith-then such liability is tantamount to impos-
ing tort liability on the contracting party itself. In either event, im-
posing tort liability on the agent impairs the contracting party's
116. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. This is where Applied Equipment
diverged from Wise. Wise held that the plaintiffs employer could be held liable
for conspiring to breach its own employment contract, based upon the principle
that "all who are involved in the common scheme are jointly and severally re-
sponsible for the ensuing wrong." Wise, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65. This holding
presupposes that the breach of employment contract was a "wrong" to be deterred
or punished. But under the theory of efficient breach endorsed by Applied Equip-
ment, a breach of contract is not wrongful. At the same time, Wise held that the
agents and employees of the Company could not be held liable for conspiracy, in
part because their conduct in inducing the breach was privileged. Id. at 665.
(The conspiracy claim was upheld as between the employer and another entity,
not as between the employer and its own agents and employees. See id. at
666-67.) But the agent's privilege exists to protect the principal's right to breach
its contract. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises
from the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 483, 534 (1994) ("The
reasonable expectations of a promisor include the right to substitute efficient
breach for performance upon payment of expectation damages."). Breaching a
contract cannot be a wrong and a right at the same time. Wise never addressed
this contradiction. Nor did Wise explain why, if "all who are involved in the com-
mon scheme" may be held liable, the employer's agents did not fall within that
rule.
117. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 434 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1998) ("The primary object of a
corporation in employing an agent is that the agent shall be enabled to accom-
plish the purposes of the agency . . ").
118. See id. ("That a corporation can act only through [its] agents is too elementary a
proposition to require the citation of authority.").
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ability to get necessary information and make the necessary decisions
to accomplish efficient breaches. The agent's privilege to induce a
breach of the contract is thus a necessary corollary to the contracting
party's own "privilege" to breach and pay only expectancy damages.119
This rationale for the agent's privilege also explains why agents
enjoy only a qualified privilege that is lost if the agent is acting for his
or her own personal gain and not for the benefit of the principal.120
The agent's privilege is based on the agent's value to the principal in
accomplishing its legitimate business goals.12 1 As long as the agent is
acting within the scope of his or her agency and for the benefit of the
principal, the purpose is served, so the privilege to induce a breach is
absolute. But if benefiting the principal is no longer the sole or pri-
mary purpose of the agent in inducing a breach, the social interest in
the agent's inducement no longer outweighs the interest in upholding
the contract, so the privilege is vitiated.122
119. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) ("An agent who does an act
otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the
command of the principal or on account of the principal, except where he is exer-
cising a privilege of the principal, or a privilege held by him for the protection of
the principal's interests .... ") (emphasis added).
120. See Ettenson v. Burke, 17 P.3d 440, 446-47 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) ("The majority
of opinions recognize that a corporate officer is privileged to interfere with his
corporation's contracts only when he acts in good faith and in the best interests of
the corporation, as opposed to his own private interests.").
121. See Paula J. Dalley, All in a Day's Work: Employer's Vicarious Liability for Sex-
ual Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 537 (2002) ("The principal also derives a
business benefit from the act of employing agents generally, because without
agency, her business would be limited to those activities she could personally un-
dertake. In short, the use of agents makes business possible.").
122. See Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631, 633 (Cal. 1941) ("[A] person is not
justified in inducing a breach of contract simply because he is in competition with
one of the parties to the contract and seeks to further his own economic advan-
tage at the expense of the other. Whatever interest society has in encouraging
free and open competition by means not in themselves unlawful, contractual sta-
bility is generally accepted as of greater importance than competitive freedom.")
(citations omitted).
The very existence of a tort of inducement of breach is arguably at odds with
the efficient breach theory: it makes tortious the persuading of another to do
something that he or she is free to do on his or her own initiative-i.e., breach
and pay damages. Remington, supra note 68, at 647. Although one could counter
that efficiency is promoted as long as the contracting party itself is not exposed to
tort damages for breaching the contract, even if third parties are, this does not
take into account that, in order for a contracting party to make well-informed
(i.e., efficient) breach decisions, it must have good information not only about the
cost of breaching, but about the benefits of breaching as well. In other words, if I
am to know whether I should break my existing deal to pursue a better one, I
have to know that another deal is out there, and how much better it is. But third
parties may be deterred from offering me the better deal in the first place if they
know that doing so may expose them to tort liability.
Whether there should be a tort of inducement of breach at all is beyond the
scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that, at least with regard to agents or em-
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2. Impropriety of the Agent's Privilege Outside the Interference
Context
Given that contractual interference is only tortious where the pur-
pose of the party in interfering is unjustified (i.e., accorded little social
value), and given the value of agents to principals in making efficient
breach decisions, the agent's privilege is a logical defense to interfer-
ence claims. But the policies underlying the agent's privilege do not
support application of an agent's privilege to conspire with the princi-
pal to commit torts other than interference with or inducement of
breach of contract.
Agents are privileged to induce a breach of the principals' contracts
because the principals themselves are effectively privileged to do so.
But principals are not "privileged" to commit torts in general, so there
is no reason for a corollary agent's privilege to conspire with or induce
a principal to commit such torts. Take fraud as an example-whereas
the law promotes efficient breach of contract by limiting damages for
breach to a foreseeable amount, there is no such thing as "efficient"
fraud. Rather, the law seeks to deter fraud outright by subjecting the
tortfeasor, not only to the possibility of punitive damages, but also to
liability for all damages that result from the wrong regardless of
whether they were foreseeable.12 3 Even if one were willing to counte-
nance a balancing of interests in the fraud context to determine if
there should be a privilege, there is no situation in which society
would weigh one party's interest in injuring another by a false repre-
sentation greater than another party's interest in being free from in-
jury as a result thereof. Courts thus err when they shield an agent
from liability for conspiracy to commit fraud or other intentional torts
(other than interference with the principal's contract) based solely on
ployees of a contracting party, the privilege to induce a breach promotes the con-
tracting party's ability to make efficient breach decisions. Perhaps agents, but
not third parties, are granted a privilege to induce a breach because it is believed
either that third parties who would benefit from the breach by luring the con-
tracting party away with a better deal have a sufficiently strong motive to
counteract or minimize the "chilling effect" of potential tort liability; or, perhaps
contracting parties are far less likely to internalize the cost of their liability via
indemnification.
123. E.g., Tew v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F. Supp. 1551, 1568 (S.D. Fla.
1990) ("Of course, in tort, if there is proximate cause, there is no requirement
that the particular type of damage be foreseeable."); Mijuskovic, supra note 62, at
563 ("Tort damages are designed to punish and deter socially reprehensible con-
duct in addition to compensating an aggrieved party. Consequently, tort remedies
are not limited by the foreseeability ceiling and may include punitive damages.").
Hence the celebrated "eggshell plaintiff' rule in tort. See, e.g., Richard A. Wright,
The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 U. SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1425,
1491 (2003) ("[Ihe universally recognized 'thin-skulled' or 'eggshell' plaintiff rule
... states that the defendant must take the plaintiff and the plaintiffs property
as the defendant finds them.").
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the fact that the agent was acting on behalf of his principal or
employer.124
Collins v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n125 illustrates the
improper extension of the agent's privilege. In Collins, the plaintiff
hotel owner took out a mortgage with the defendant Union Federal.
The plaintiffs hotel was unsuccessful, and after he was unable to dis-
pose of the property by sale or lease, Union Federal foreclosed. Union
Federal submitted the only bid at the foreclosure sale, and subse-
quently resold the property. 126 The plaintiff alleged that Union Fed-
eral and two of its officers conspired to induce prospective purchasers
not to purchase the hotel from plaintiff, but instead to buy it from
Union Federal at a lower price after the foreclosure sale.127 The Ne-
vada Supreme Court, citing cases in which agents interfered with
their principals' contracts, held that the officer defendants could not
be held liable for conspiring with their corporate principal where there
was no evidence that they were acting for their own, individual
advantage. 128
The allegation in Collins was not that Union Federal officers inter-
fered with the plaintiffs contract with Union Federal; rather, it was
that Union Federal and its officers interfered with the plaintiffs pro-
spective economic advantage with other potential purchasers of the
property prior to foreclosure.12 9 While it may be the case that a defen-
dant cannot interfere with or conspire to interfere with its own con-
tract 130 or prospective economic advantage, 13 1 there is no reason why
it cannot be liable for interfering with or conspiring to interfere with
the plaintiffs contract or prospective economic advantage with a third
party. Union Federal did have its own mortgage loan contract with
the plaintiff, but Union Federal was in the position of a competitor vis-
A-vis the plaintiffs relationship with the potential purchasers. There
124. See, e.g., Elliott v. Tilton, 89 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 1996) (immunizing duly acting
agents from liability for conspiracy to commit fraud and intentional infliction of
emotion distress); Black v. Bank of Amer., N.T. & S.A., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (same).
125. 662 P.2d 610 (Nev. 1983).
126. Id. at 613-14.
127. See id. at 622.
128. Id. (citing Wise v. S. Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963); Bliss v. S.
Pac. Co., 321 P.2d 324 (Or. 1958)).
129. Id. ("Collins alleged that the respondents conspired with one another and with
each or all of the prospective purchasers of the Reef Hotel to induce the prospec-
tive purchasers not to purchase or lease the Reef Hotel from Collins.").
130. Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd., 869 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1994).
131. See Kasparian v. County of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 102-03 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) ("If a party has no liability in tort for refusing to perform an existing
contract, no matter what the reason, he certainly should not have to bear a bur-
den in tort for refusing to enter into a contract where he has no obligation to do
so.").
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was no allegation that either Union Federal or its employees were act-
ing as agents of the potential purchasers, 132 so the defendants could
not have enjoyed an agent's privilege with regard to them. Union Fed-
eral's act of interference was unprivileged because its interest in ob-
taining the property did not outweigh the societal interest in having
an open and untainted market for the property.' 33 And because
Union Federal had no privilege or justification for interfering, it was
not appropriate to give its officers a corollary agent's privilege to do so.
Using the agent's privilege to support a general defense to conspir-
acy claims is at odds with other limitations on civil conspiracy, such as
the underlying duty requirement. Under the underlying duty require-
ment, if a defendant cannot be held directly liable for committing a
tort, she cannot be held secondarily liable for conspiring with another
to commit the tort.134 Logically, the inverse should also hold true: if
the defendant can be held directly liable for committing the tort, she
should also be subject to secondary liability for conspiring with an-
other to commit that tort. In other words, just as acting in concert
cannot destroy a privilege or "abrogate an immunity,"135 it should
likewise not create a privilege or immunity. Even courts that endorse
the agent's immunity rule agree that corporate directors and officers
may be held liable in tort "as conspirators or otherwise" if they "di-
rectly order, authorize or participate in the corporation's tortious con-
duct"' 36 -i.e., they may be liable directly for their own torts.' 3 7 It is
inconsistent to hold that duly acting agents cannot be held liable for
132. Indeed, the individual defendants were alleged to have been acting solely in their
capacity as agents or employees of Union Federal. Collins, 662 P.2d at 622. Al-
leging that the individual defendants were acting within the course and scope of
their agency for a corporation is fairly common, as plaintiffs frequently seek to
hold the entity liable for the acts of its agents under respondeat superior theory.
In a sense, the agent's immunity rule prevents plaintiffs from having their cake
and eating it, too: treating the agent act's as those of the corporation for respon-
deat superior purposes, and treating the agents as separate from the entity for
conspiracy purposes. As discussed infra notes 175-83, however, the two theories
are not necessarily inconsistent.
133. See supra note 122.
134. See, e.g., McMartin v. Children's Inst. Int'l, 261 Cal. Rptr. 437, 445 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) ("As long as the underlying wrongs are subject to privilege, defendants can-
not be held liable for a conspiracy to commit those wrongs. Acting in concert with
others does not destroy the immunity of defendants.").
135. Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 459.
136. Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court, 775 P.2d 508, 513 (Cal. 1989) (citing Wyatt v.
Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45, 52 (Cal. 1979)).
137. This is the case even if they are acting solely in their capacity as agents. See, e.g.,
Van Dam Egg Co. v. Allendale Farms, Inc., 489 A.2d 1209, 1211 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985) ("A corporate officer or director is liable to persons injured by his
own torts, even though he was acting on behalf of a corporation and his intent
was to benefit the corporation... ."); Glenn D. West & Susan Y. Chao, Corpora-
tions, 56 SMU L. REv. 1395, 1403 (2003) ("Texas has long recognized that, as a
general rule, corporate agents (including officers and directors) are individually
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conspiring to commit torts that they can be held liable for committing
directly. Yet this is precisely the result when the agent's immunity
rule is applied as a defense to civil conspiracy claims generally.
As was discussed above, the underlying duty requirement impairs
the conspiracy policy of punishing culpable actors by shielding certain
parties from liability on a basis-a lack of duty-that is unrelated to
their culpability. However, the requirement is defensible in that it
only limits liability for culpable actors where doing so promotes the
policy of limiting the class of persons who owe the underlying tort
duty.138 The agent's immunity rule also impairs conspiracy policy by
shielding culpable actors from liability. It, too, is defensible only if it
promotes some other policy.
When exported outside of the interference context in which the
privilege developed, the agent's immunity rule does not promote sub-
stantive tort policy. On a claim against an agent for conspiring to in-
terfere with the principal's contract, the agent's privilege theory
negates an agent's tort duty to avoid interfering, and the underlying
duty requirement preserves that policy by preventing the agent from
being held liable for conspiring to interfere. This is the key distinction
that opinions such as Applied Equipment either failed to grasp or
failed to articulate in asserting the existence of a broad-based agent's
immunity rule-although the agent's privilege is relevant to claims
for conspiracy to interfere, it is relevant to the underlying interference
claim, not to the conspiracy allegations. 139 The agent's privilege the-
ory simply has no bearing on conspiracies to commit most torts.
Where everyone owes the underlying tort duty, such as the duty to
refrain from committing fraud, no tort policy is promoted by exempt-
ing a certain class of defendants-agents and employees-from con-
spiring to commit it. Indeed, fraud doctrine converges with conspiracy
doctrine in seeking to deter and punish all culpable actors. Thus, the
agent's immunity rule undermines fraud policy as well.
Given that the agent's immunity rule promotes neither conspiracy
policy nor substantive tort policy, the only possible defense of the rule
is that it promotes the policies of agency law. This leads us to the
second doctrine from which the agent's immunity rule is derived-the
single legal actor theory.
liable for their own torts even if committed solely in the scope of their agency on
behalf of their corporation.").
138. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
139. It is understandable that courts might overlook this distinction. Interference
with contract and conspiracy to breach a contract both involve non-contracting
parties disrupting a contracting party's agreement with the plaintiff. It is also
likely that the plaintiffs who craft the claims that come before the courts are not
crisply distinguishing between conspiracy to breach a contract and conspiracy to
induce a breach of contract. However, that the oversight is understandable does
not alleviate the problems that result therefrom.
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B. The Single Legal Actor Theory
Under basic principles of corporate agency law, a corporation is
personified through the acts of its agents. 140 Thus, when agents of a
corporation act, their acts are deemed to be the corporation's acts, and
the corporation is viewed as the only legal actor. 14 1 Because a con-
spiracy requires an agreement, and an agreement requires a meeting
of the minds between two or more actors, the fiction that the corpora-
tion is the sole legal actor defeats a conspiracy claim because a corpo-
ration cannot "conspire" with itself any more than an individual
can.14 2 Like the agent's privilege theory, the single legal actor the-
ory14 3 provides an exception-the agent loses immunity where the
agent is acting for personal gain and not to benefit the company. 14 4
The exception makes sense-if the agent is not acting as an instru-
ment of the principal, there is no reason to respect the fiction that the
principal is personified "through" the agent.
Between the agent's privilege theory and the single legal actor the-
ory, the latter is more commonly relied upon in immunizing agents
from conspiracy liability.145 This is not surprising given that the sin-
140. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 1982); see Kathleen F.
Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L.
REV. 431, 437-40 (1983).
141. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 970.
142. See Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.
1952) ("It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or
entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more
than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent
are the acts of the corporation.").
143. This Article eschews the more commonly-used term "intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine" for two reasons. First, scholars have used that term inconsistently to
refer both to courts rejecting and upholding the viability of claims of conspiracy
between a corporation and its agents. Compare Brickey, supra note 12, at 144-45
("Under the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine ... federal courts have almost
uniformly held that a corporation and its officers and agents are generally inca-
pable of conspiring under section 1 of the Sherman Act."), with John T. Prisbe,
The Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 538, 538 (1987)
("Under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, a corporation is deemed capable
of engaging in a conspiracy with its own officers, directors, employees, and
agents."). Second, the single legal actor theory, as extended via the agent's im-
munity rule, may not necessarily be confined to the corporate context. See infra
notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914 (dismissing intracorporate conspiracy
claim where plaintiff did not allege any exception to the single legal actor rule,
such as where "officers, agents, and employees were actuated by any motives per-
sonal to themselves"); Wise v. S. Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963) (immunizing agents where they act "in their official capacities on behalf of
the corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage").
145. Most cases that immunized agents from liability for interference with contract
rely upon both the agent's privilege theory and single legal actor theory. See, e.g.,
Wise, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (citing Bliss v. S. Pac. Co., 321 P.2d 324, 328-29 (Or.
1958)), which itself relied upon the seminal single legal actor case of Nelson Ra-
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gle legal actor theory is actually a defense to conspiracy claims,
whereas the agent's privilege theory is really a defense to underlying
claims for interference with contract. However, the single legal actor
theory is just as problematic as the agent's privilege theory when used
as a justification for a broad-based agent's immunity rule.
Given that the agent's immunity rule undercuts both conspiracy
and substantive tort policy, it is only justifiable to use the single legal
actor theory to broadly immunize agents from civil liability if doing so
maintains consistency in agency law. If the agents "are" the corpora-
tion for other purposes, then arguably they should also "be" the corpo-
ration for purposes of conspiracy's plurality requirement.
But consistency in agency law is a myth. The single legal actor
theory has not been applied uniformly to conspiracy claims in the vari-
ous fields of law in which it has arisen. It is applied in some contexts
but not others in order to accommodate the particular substantive
concerns at stake. The result should be no different for common law
civil conspiracies.
1. The Single Legal Actor Theory in the Antitrust Context
The single legal actor theory actually addresses several related,
but distinct, questions. First, can the acts of a single corporate agent
constitute a conspiracy under the theory that the agent and corpora-
tion "agreed" with each other? Second, can multiple agents of a single
corporation constitute a conspiracy? Third, under what circumstances
can a corporation be held liable for conspiracy based on the acts of its
agents?146
In the antitrust context, the general rule is that acts by one or
more agents of a single corporation do not constitute a conspiracy.
Conspiracies in restraint of trade are prohibited by section 1 of the
Sherman Act.14 7 Unlike other antitrust statutes, which prohibit uni-
lateral conduct and so raise no issue of multiplicity of actors, section 1
dio in dismissing a claim against an agent for conspiring with the employer to
breach the employer's contract. The inverse, however, is not true: opinions apply-
ing the agent's immunity rule to claims other than interference often rely upon
the single legal actor theory without mentioning the agent's privilege theory.
See, e.g., Elliott v. Tilton, 89 F.3d 260, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1996) (conspiracy to com-
mit fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Worley v. Columbia
Gas of Ky., Inc., 491 F.2d 256, 260 (6th Cir. 1973) (conspiracy to commit mali-
cious prosecution).
146. These questions go to intracorporate conspiracies. There is separate line of in-
quiry, which is beyond the scope of this Article, regarding "intra-enterprise con-
spiracies," i.e., whether a parent and subsidiary, or multiple subsidiaries of a
single corporation, can conspire with each other. See Brickey, supra note 140, at
432-33 & n.4 (discussing the treatment of the plurality requirement in the intra-
enterprise conspiracy context).
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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requires a plurality of actors to establish a violation; it is one of those
relatively rare instances where what would be permissible if done
alone (restraint of trade) is illegal when two or more persons combine
to do it.148 Courts have uniformly held that a single agent cannot
combine with his or her corporation to form a conspiracy to restrain
trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act; two or more minds
must be involved. 14 9 Although the law entertains the legal fiction of
the corporation as a "person," it would be a stretch to say that when an
individual acts unilaterally, there is an agreement or combination be-
tween the agent and the fictional entity. Moreover, without the single
legal actor theory, conspiracy liability would be automatic every time
an agent acted within the scope of employment.150
When multiple agents within a single company combine, however,
the meeting of two or more minds exists even without "counting" the
corporation as separate actor. In these circumstances, the supposed
conflict between agency principles (which treat the corporation as ex-
isting through its agents) and conspiracy principles (which treat the
corporation as an entity separate from its agents) is absent. Never-
theless, the majority rule is that an intracorporate combination of
multiple agents, just like the unilateral act of a single agent, does not
constitute a conspiracy for purposes of the antitrust laws.151
There are several rationales for this rule. First,[s]ince a corporation can only
act through its officers, and since normal commercial conduct of a single
trader alone may restrain trade, many activities of any business could be in-
terdicted were joint action solely by agents of a single corporation acting on its
behalf held to constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
1 5 2
148. See Welling, supra note 39, at 1158 & n.17 (citing cases). Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act also prohibits conspiracies to monopolize trade, which requires a plural-
ity of actors, but in addition also prohibits actual and attempted monopolization,
which may be committed by one person. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Brickey, supra
note 140, at 438 n.22 (noting that this distinction may be material in analyzing
conspiracy claims brought under either section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act); Wel-
ling, supra note 39, at 1158 n.15.
149. See, e.g., Union Pac. Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1909).
The court explained:
[A] corporation can act only by an agent, and every time an agent com-
mits an offense within the scope of his authority under [the govern-
ment's] theory the corporation necessarily combines with him to commit
it. This cannot be, and it is not, the law. The union of two or more per-
sons, the conscious participation in the scheme of two or more minds, is
indispensable to an unlawful combination, and it cannot be created by
the action of one man alone.
Id. at 745; see also Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 396
(5th Cir. 1976) (reaching similar result); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614,
617 (3d Cir. 1960) (same).
150. Welling, supra note 39, at 1161.
151. See id. at 1162-63 (discussing the majority approach as taken in Nelson Radio &
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952)).
152. Atty. Gen., REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 31
(1955); see also Welling, supra note 39, at 1164 & n.45 (citing same).
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Second, a combination within a single company does not raise the an-
ticompetitive concerns that section 1 was designed to protect
against-namely, anticompetitive conduct between separate business
entities. 153 Third, holding that the conduct of a single company con-
stituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act would render meaningless section 2's coverage of
monopolization. 154
Thus, the prioritization of agency principles over conspiracy princi-
ples cannot alone explain the rejection of multiple-agent conspiracies
in the antitrust context. The single legal actor rule in the antitrust
context is based on substantive antitrust policy, not conspiracy law or
agency law.
2. The Single Legal Actor Theory in the Criminal Context
Notably, the same courts that have rejected intracorporate conspir-
acies under the antitrust laws have upheld such conspiracies under
the general federal conspiracy statute.15 5 Although, as in the anti-
trust context, courts reject criminal conspiracies where a single corpo-
rate agent acts unilaterally,156 they will uphold conspiracy liability
where multiple agents within a single corporation act together.157
The acts of multiple agents within a corporation may support crim-
inal conspiracy liability, but against whom? The potential liability of
the agents and the corporation involve different considerations. If cor-
153. See Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ("[T]he antitrust laws aim at preserving independent eco-
nomic decisions, which supposes cooperation inside economic entities-coopera-
tion that cannot be called "conspiratorial" without defeating the foundation of
competition."); Ray v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 430 F. Supp. 1353, 1358
(W.D.N.C. 1977) ("Officers and directors of a single business entity are not ex-
pected to compete with each other. Thus, a conspiracy among them does not ordi-
narily present the anti-competitive problems the Sherman Act was intended to
proscribe.").
154. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[Alpplying
the prohibition of combinations in restraint of trade contained in section 1 of the
Sherman Act to activities by a single firm renders meaningless section 2 ....
Prisbe, supra note 143, at 546-47.
155. Brickey, supra note 12, at 144-45; compare, e.g., Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v.
Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to find an
antitrust conspiracy between a corporation and various of its employees), with
Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 378-80 (8th Cir. 1943) (upholding criminal
conspiracy between corporation and its agents).
156. Welling, supra note 39, at 1186 (citing United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939,
941 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (adding that where an agent acts unilaterally, a finding of
plurality "would over-extend the fiction of corporate personality")).
157. State v. Parker, 158 A. 797, 800 (Conn. 1932); People v. Dunbar Contracting Co.,
151 N.Y.S. 164, 166 (1914); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 100 S.W. 705, 718 (Tenn.
1907)); Brickey, supra note 140, at 439-40; Welling, supra note 39, at 1197-99
(citing Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1
porate agents combine together to pursue an unlawful objective, they
are criminally liable for their own conduct, and are not shielded by the
corporate form.1SS Indeed, each agent is liable for his or her own role
in the combination, regardless whether he or she is acting on behalf of
the corporation or for her own personal gain. 159 Whether or not the
corporation will be held criminally liable for conspiracy based on the
acts of its agents, however, is based on traditional principles of respon-
deat superior. 160 If multiple agents of a corporation conspire together,
the plurality requirement of a conspiracy is met. As long as at least
one of those agents is acting within the scope of his or her agency or
employment, the corporation will be held vicariously liable-even if
the other co-conspirators are non-agents.161 By contrast, even if all
the co-conspirators are agents, if each of them is acting outside the
scope of their employment, the corporation will not be held liable for
conspiracy because there is no basis through which to apply respon-
deat superior.
Courts have thus rejected the agent's immunity rule in the crimi-
nal context: there is no immunity for agents who conspire with their
corporate principal or employer. Accordingly, there is also no place for
a personal gain exception: agents are liable for their own conspiracies,
regardless of whether they do so in their capacity as agents or individ-
uals. That an agent acted for personal gain may be relevant, in that it
158. United States v. Bach, 151 F.2d 177, 179 (7th Cir. 1945) ("Corporate agents may
be criminally liable individually for acts done by them on behalf of the corpora-
tion, even though the corporation may or may not be liable."); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) ("An agent who does an act otherwise a tort is
not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the princi-
pal or on account of the principal . . . "); Welling, supra note 39, at 1176 ("[Tlhe
individual agent remains personally liable for the crime, notwithstanding the im-
position of liability upon the corporation.").
159. See, e.g., Bach, 151 F.2d at 179. The Bach court explained:
The fact that the price was paid to Pines Bros. Distributing Company
and did not go to the defendant does not relieve him from his criminal
responsibility for having made the sale. He actually participated in the
transaction and knowingly and intentionally sold the whiskey at a price
over the ceiling. The fact that the corporation may or may not also be
liable does not absolve its agent who makes an illegal sale, even though,
at the time of the sale, he is acting in a representative capacity.
Id.
160. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and
an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 400-15 (1982); Welling, supra note 39, at
1177.
161. Brickey, supra note 140, at 441. Brickey explained:
The company is held liable for conspiracy because once the acts and in-
tent of its own agent are imputed to it, the corporation is accountable for
the legal consequences that flow from the agent's interaction with the
outside purchasing agent. In other words, [the corporate agent] has the
power to engage the corporation in a conspiracy with the outside
purchasing agent.
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may constitute circumstantial evidence of the existence of an agree-
ment and/or of the agent's specific intent to achieve the objective of the
conspiracy.' 6 2 But it should not be relevant to whether the agent is
immune from liability in the first place. And from the corporation's
perspective, whether the agent is acting to benefit the corporation or
the agent herself is relevant to whether the corporation will be held
liable for the agent's conspiracy under respondeat superior principles.
3. Comparing the Single Legal Actor Rules in the Criminal and
Antitrust Contexts
The difference in the treatment of agents in the antitrust and crim-
inal contexts can be explained by the different policy considerations in
the two contexts. 16 3 The foundation of the criminal conspiracy doc-
trine is the notion that the joint nature of the enterprise increases the
risk of successful achievement of the unlawful objective above and be-
yond the risk that would exist if the participants acted independently
of each other.164 When multiple corporate agents act together, the
likelihood that they will accomplish their goals is often higher (be-
cause of efficiency, pooled resources, increased morale, etc.) than if
they would have acted independently.
But the premise of punishing concerted conduct is that the object is
wrongful, not that the conduct is concerted. 16 5 The conduct that crim-
inal law targets is different from the conduct targeted by antitrust
law. Where corporate agents combine to falsify documents, give
bribes, or defraud the government, there is no doubt that the object is
wrongful.166 Such acts cannot be said to be incidental to legitimate
business activity. However, where corporate agents coordinate to con-
duct activity that results in the restraint of trade, their actions are not
162. Cf. United States v. Hammond, 642 F.2d 248, 250 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[Tlhe motive
of the accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid deter-
mination of the state of mind or intent of the defendant."); Alan R. Bromberg &
Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examina-
tion, 52 ALE. L. REV. 637, 739-48 (1988) ("Benefit or gain derived by the aider-
abettor is not one of the three traditional elements of aiding-abetting-primary
violation, knowledge, and substantial assistance. Benefit nonetheless has signifi-
cance in aid-abet cases. The courts mention it with some frequency and attach
varying weight to its presence or absence in deciding whether either the knowl-
edge or the substantial assistance requirements (or both) are satisfied.").
163. But see Shaun P. Martin, Intracorporate Conspiracies, 50 STAN. L. REV. 399, 434
(1998) (arguing that there is no tenable basis for continuing to uphold intracorpo-
rate criminal conspiracies in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), notwithstanding
that the facts in Copperweld raised antitrust issues).
164. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
165. See Mijuskovic, supra note 62, at 567 ("There is nothing inherently wrong with
agreeing and planning to take a particular course of action.").
166. Brickey, supra note 140, 440 & nn.32-33, 36.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
necessarily "wrongful" in the eyes of antitrust law. The object of all
competition is, in a sense, to restrain trade, and the Sherman Act was
designed first and foremost to promote competition. 167 The Sherman
Act thus seeks not to eliminate the restraint of trade, but rather to
induce an optimal level of trade restraint. Accordingly, courts restrict
the scope of intracorporate conspiracy liability so as to avoid chilling
socially desirable conduct.168
Criminal conspiracy law, by contrast, does not seek to induce an
optimal level of unlawful activity. It seeks to eliminate it. Because
there is no risk of chilling legitimate conduct in the criminal context,
intracorporate conspiracy liability can be more expansive than in the
antitrust context and still promote the goals of the substantive law at
issue.
4. Whether to Apply the Single Legal Actor Theory to Bar
Common Law Civil Conspiracy Claims
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the single legal actor
theory is not applied uniformly: courts utilize it in some contexts and
reject it in others, depending on the applicable substantive policies in
a given context. When a court is facing a common law civil conspiracy
claim against an agent or agents for conspiring with a principal, it
should choose whether to borrow the antitrust rule (accepting the sin-
gle legal actor theory) or the criminal rule (rejecting it) by comparing
the substantive policies at stake in those contexts to the substantive
policies at stake before it.169
167. See N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The court explained:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But
even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition.
Id.
168. See Brickey, supra note 140, at 439. For example:
By definition, the most successful competition might thereby be found
illegal because it is dependent upon day to day communication, consulta-
tion and agreement among corporate officers and employees. Courts
have therefore sought to minimize the risk that joint internal decisions
will be held to violate the antitrust laws by generally requiring that sep-
arate business entities constitute the conspiracy.
Id.
169. Antitrust and criminal conspiracies are not the only two contexts in which the
single legal actor issue has arisen. Intracorporate conspiracies have frequently
been alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which provides a private cause of action
for individuals injured by a conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights. Doug-
las G. Smith, The Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine and 42 U.S.C. §19 85.3: The
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a. Applicability of the Single Legal Actor Theory to
Interference Claims
Utilizing a methodology in which a court decides whether to apply
the single legal actor theory based on substantive policy considera-
tions yields the same results as a policy-based methodology for apply-
ing the other source of the agent's immunity rule, the agent's privilege
theory. In other words, it should be applied to claims for conspiracy to
interfere, but not to civil conspiracy claims generally.
Consider the propriety of applying the single legal actor theory to
bar a claim against an agent for conspiring to interfere with the prin-
cipal's contract. Recall that under the agent's privilege theory, agents
are permitted to induce a breach so as to prevent the breaching
party-the principal-from absorbing the cost of the agent's tort lia-
bility (either through a chilling effect on the agents' conduct or
through indemnification). 170 A fundamental assumption supporting
this rationale is that a breach of contract by the principal is not
wrongful, but is an incident of legitimate business.
Similarly, the primary concern underlying application of the single
legal actor rule in the antitrust context is that an alternative rule that
upheld intracorporate conspiracies could proscribe legitimate business
activity and impair competition. Because the policy concern in the in-
terference context is similar to that in antitrust contexts-promoting
economically desirable behavior-the result should be the same: the
agent should be deemed to "be" the principal when bringing about the
breach (just as the agent "was" the principal when executing the con-
Original Intent, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1996). The majority rule is that an
intracorporate conspiracy is not viable in the civil rights context. Id. at 1148-51.
This arguably promotes congressional intent and prevents 42 U.S.C. §1985(3)
from becoming a "general federal tort statute." Id. at 1138-39 (quoting Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971)). The majority rule in the civil rights
context thus mirrors the majority rule in the antitrust context, albeit for different
reasons. But see Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108,
110 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.). In Travis, the court explained:
[Tihe antitrust laws aim at preserving independent economic decisions,
which supposes cooperation inside economic entities-cooperation that
cannot be called "conspiratorial" without defeating the foundation of
competition. Similarly, § 1985 aims at preserving independent decisions
by persons or business entities, free of the pressure that can be gener-
ated by conspiracies, and again intra-corporate discussions lie outside
the statute's domain.
Id. Nothing in this Article suggests that courts should disregard civil rights con-
spiracy opinions, or opinions dealing with principal-agent conspiracies in any
other context in which they might arise, so long as those opinions include a rea-
soned analysis of the particular policy concerns at stake. The antitrust and crim-
inal contexts are simply paradigmatic of divergent outcomes in different
substantive arenas.
170. See supra notes 118-19 and accompany text.
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tract on behalf of the principal in the first place).171 In other words, if
the tort duty not to interfere with a contract falls only on "stran-
gers"' 7 2 and the world is divided into two categories-contracting par-
ties who do not owe a tort duty to avoid interfering, and strangers who
do owe such a duty-the agent will stand in the shoes of the con-
tracting party in order to avoid tort liability,173 whether it be for inter-
ference, conspiracy to interfere, or any other formulation that a
creative plaintiff could concoct.
Having a personal gain exception to the single legal actor rule also
makes sense in the interference context. From a doctrinal perspec-
tive, if the agent is not merely acting as an instrumentality or "arm" of
the principal, but rather in an individual capacity, there is little rea-
son to accept the legal fiction of the principal as the only legal actor.
Similarly, from a policy perspective, if the self-serving agent is not act-
ing purely to help the principal make efficient breach decisions, the
social value in immunizing the agent is lost.
Conversely, the rationale for rejecting the single legal actor theory
in the criminal conspiracy context-the group danger rationale-does
not apply to intracorporate conspiracies to breach the corporation's
contract. Under the efficient breach theory, a breach of contract is not
really a "danger" at all. It may be something to be regulated, but not
eradicated. And to the extent that a breach of contract is considered a
danger to the other contracting party or to society at large, there is no
increased danger where agents of a corporation coordinate to bring
about a breach, because the decision to breach would not have been
made or effectuated other than through the agents of the corpora-
tion.174 Thus, at least in the context of claims for conspiracy to inter-
171. See 2A C.J.S. Agency § 402 (2004) ("If the agent acts within the scope of the
agency when the agent enters into a contract with a third person, the principal
immediately becomes a contracting party, with both rights and liabilities to the
third person. Since an agent acts for the principal in a representative capacity,
the principal, rather than the agent, is ordinarily bound by a contract entered
into by the agent on behalf of the principal.").
172. Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1994)
("One contracting party owes no general tort duty to another not to interfere with
performance of the contract; its duty is simply to perform the contract according
to its terms. The tort duty not to interfere with the contract falls only on stran-
gers-interlopers who have no legitimate interest in the scope of course of the
contract's performance.").
173. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054, 1069 (Cal. 1990) (for purposes of
claims against corporate agents to induce wrongful termination of employment
contract, "these defendants stand in the place of the employer, because the em-
ployer-the other party to the supposed contract-cannot act except through
such agents").
174. See, e.g., Mallard v. Boring, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (duly
acting employee "could not induce a breach of contract; if there was a breach, he
breached it for and on behalf of his principal").
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fere, it makes more sense to borrow from the antitrust context than
the criminal context.
b. Inapplicability of the Single Legal Actor Theory to
Intentional Torts Generally
When the law targets coordinated conduct resulting in the re-
straint of trade or a breach of a contract, as it does in the antitrust and
interference contexts, there is a concern that upholding intracorporate
conspiracy may limit normal or even desirable commercial conduct.
But the same cannot be said of a conspiracy among a corporation's
agents to commit fraud. Like criminal law, tort law seeks to eradicate,
not regulate, fraud, whether it is perpetrated alone, through others, or
in concert with others.
If anything, an intracorporate conspiracy to commit fraud is a par-
adigmatic case of group danger: agents and employees using the re-
sources of the corporate form to increase the efficiency, scope, and
likelihood of success of their wrongdoing. This increased group danger
is present regardless of whether any or all of the agents are acting to
benefit the corporation or for their personal gain. So long as their
wrongdoing causes compensable harm to an identifiable victim-the
factor that distinguishes the deterrent effect of the civil system from
that of the criminal system-conspiring agents should be shown no
more lenience in the civil system than under the criminal system.
That courts might borrow from the criminal context in setting the
scope of liability for civil intracorporate conspiracies should be rela-
tively uncontroversial, given that criminal law borrowed corporate lia-
bility doctrine from tort law in the first place. 1 75 Historically,
corporations were held to be immune from criminal liability, primarily
because fictional entities were seen as being incapable of having the
requisite mens rea or specific intent.17 6 Corporate criminal liability
was first upheld in the mid-nineteenth century in the context of strict
175. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1979) [hereinafter
Developments] ("The respondeat superior doctrine of corporate criminal liability
[is] derived from agency principles of tort law .... ."); Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens
Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Prrr. L. REV. 21, 39 (1957) ("The growth of corpo-
rate criminal liability was fostered by analogies from the law of torts."); see also
N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909). The
New York Central Court explained:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther
in holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority dele-
gated to him . . . may be controlled, in the interest of public policy, by
imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corpo-
ration for which he is acting in the premises.
Id.
176. Welling, supra note 39, at 1174.
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liability crimes for which no mens rea is required.1 7 7 However, this
intent-based distinction was later abandoned, as courts adopted the
view that the corporate agent's intent could be imputed to the corpora-
tion under the tort theory of respondeat superior.178 This is now the
common law rule in the federal courts and in most states.1 7 9 Thus, as
long as the agent commits a crime within the scope of employment and
with the intent to benefit the corporation, the corporation itself will be
criminally liable. 8 0 A corporation's criminal liability for the acts of
its agents is determined by the same respondeat superior principles,
regardless of whether the agent commits the crime of conspiracy or
some other crime. The agents, of course, are also liable for their own
criminal conduct, regardless of whether or not the corporation is also
held vicariously liable. 181
There is no reason why tort law should not take respondeat supe-
rior doctrine "back" from criminal law and apply it to civil conspira-
cies.18 2 Just as a corporation's criminal liability for the acts of its
agents turns on whether the agent was acting on behalf of the corpora-
tion, so should its civil liability. Likewise, agents are liable for their
own torts, 183 just as they are liable for their own crimes. Accordingly,
177. Id. at 1175; see State v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 23 N.J.L. 360, 370 (N.J. 1852).
The court clarified that corporations cannot
be liable for any crime of which a corrupt intent or malus animus is an
essential ingredient. But the creation of a mere nuisance involves no
such element. It is totally immaterial whether the person erecting the
nuisance does it ignorantly or by design, with a good intent or an evil
intent; and there is no reason why for such an offence a corporation
should not be indicted.
Id.
178. Developments, supra note 175, at 1247.
179. Id.
180. Id.; Welling, supra note 39, at 1176.
181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
182. If anything, doing so makes more sense in the civil context than in the criminal
context. Although the stated rationales for applying respondeat superior liability
vary, the doctrine is tied less to fault or responsibility than to the notion that the
enterprise should absorb its agents' liability as a cost of doing business and can
spread the costs of such damage to consumers. Rhett B. Franklin, Pouring New
Wine Into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation for Determining Liability of an Em-
ployer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570, 573-76 (1994). Some
commentators thus argue that application of respondeat superior is inappropri-
ate in the criminal context. See, e.g., Samuel R. Miller, Corporate Criminal Lia-
bility: A Principle Extended to its Limits, 38 FED. BAR J. 49, 68 (1979) ("Blindly
applying tort principles of respondeat superior in the criminal context will only
undermine the complex and difficult task of ensuring corporate compliance with
the law."); Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of the Their
Agents, 60 HARv. L. REV. 283, 285 (1946) ("[Slhifting of the burden of loss to con-
sumers, which is a principal justification of respondeat superior in the law of
torts, has no application in the criminal law.").
183. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. This assumes that the agent is
not otherwise immune from liability. See Glenn G. Morris, Personal Liability for
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if a corporate agent incurs civil liability for combining with another
(be it a second agent of the corporation or an independent third party)
and tortious damage results, the agent should be held liable. And if
the agent was acting on behalf of the corporation when conspiring, the
corporation should also be held liable.
A potential weakness in analogizing to corporate criminal conspir-
acy liability is what may be called the "double vicarious liability" prob-
lem. Criminal conspiracy is an independent crime. Thus, there is no
reason to distinguish between a corporation's vicarious liability when
its agent commits the crime of conspiracy as opposed to other
crimes.18 4 But civil conspiracy is not an independent tort; it is itself a
theory of vicarious liability. So holding a corporation liable for its
agent's conspiracy is not necessarily the same as holding it liable for
the agent's torts.1 8 5 Arguably, imposing civil conspiracy liability on
the corporation under a respondeat superior theory means that the
corporation is vicariously liable for the agent's own vicarious liability.
But double vicarious liability should be no more problematic than,
say, double hearsay. Just as multiple levels of hearsay do not bar ad-
mission of evidence so long as a hearsay exception is satisfied at each
level,18 6 multiple levels of vicariously liability should not bar liability
so long as its imposition is justified at each level. Where a corporate
agent conspires with another to commit an intentional tort such as
fraud, the group danger rationale supports imposing liability on the
agent for the damage that results from the co-conspirator's wrongful
acts done in furtherance of the combination. And if the agent was act-
ing within the scope of his agency and with the intent to benefit the
corporation in so conspiring, this justifies imputing his intent to the
corporation under respondeat superior.
Thus, although there may be exceptions, including contractual in-
terference claims, the single legal actor theory does not justify apply-
ing the agent's immunity rule to most common law civil conspiracy
claims. Rather, the agents should be held liable for conspiracy based
Corporate Participants Without Corporate Veil-Piercing: Louisiana Law, 54 LA.
L. REV. 207, 244-45 (1993) ("A shareholder has no more right to commit a tort for
a separate corporate person than he has to commit the same tort for himself or
others. Absent immunity, justification, or privilege, if the conduct is tortious, then
the tortfeasor is personally liable. The fact that the tortfeasor happens to be a
corporate shareholder, officer, agent, or employee is irrelevant.") (emphasis ad-
ded). The thrust of this Article, of course, is that whether an immunity, justifica-
tion or privilege should exist depends upon the substantive policies of the
underlying offense, not conspiracy or agency doctrine.
184. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
186. See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 280 (1994) ("Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
similar state rules and statutes, including the Uniform Rules of Evidence, hear-
say included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of
the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule.").
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on their own conduct, and the corporate principal should be vicari-
ously liable if the criteria for respondeat superior are satisfied.
5. Should the Agent's Immunity Rule Apply to Individual
Principals?
It is not clear if courts would confine the agent's immunity rule to
situations in which the principal is a fictional entity, or if instead they
would apply it even where the principal is an individual. In Applied
Equipment, the court held that the agent's immunity rule "emanates"
from the holding in Wise that "[a] gents and employees of a corporation
cannot conspire with their corporate principal where they act in their
official capacities .... ',187 But Applied Equipment's formulation of the
rule itself does not qualify the rule by limiting it to the corporate prin-
cipal or employer. There, the court held that "duly acting agents and
employees cannot be held liable for conspiring with their own princi-
pals."18 8 This language suggests that a duly acting agent of an indi-
vidual principal or employer could also be immune.
The single legal actor theory is derived from the notion that a cor-
poration is a fictional entity that cannot act but through its agents.
Although an individual principal may, just like a corporation, be held
vicariously liable for the acts of her agent committed within the scope
of the agency,1 8 9 an individual can act other than through her agents.
Should we entertain the fiction of the single legal actor in this context?
Again, it depends on substantive policy. Where the agent acting in
the best interests of the individual principal counsels the principal to
breach a contract, maintaining the distinction between tort and con-
tract supports immunizing both the principal and the agent from tort
liability. This is true either under the theory that the agent is "privi-
leged" to induce a breach, or under the theory that the agent "was" the
breaching party and thus owed no tort duty not to interfere. Con-
versely, where the individual principal and agent agree to commit
fraud or some other intentional injury, the increased group danger of
two or more people acting in concert exists, just as it would absent the
principal-agent relationship. There is no policy justification either for
granting the agent a privilege to conspire or for considering the princi-
pal to be the only legal actor.
187. Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 458 n.4 (Cal.
1994) (quoting Wise v. S. Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963))
(emphasis added).
188. Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
189. See generally Dalley, supra note 121 (discussing myriad rationales for holding
principal liable for agent's torts).
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IV. UNDERSTANDING WHY COURTS APPLY THE AGENT'S
IMMUNITY RULE
This Article has suggested that, because agents are liable for their
own torts, even when acting on behalf of their principal, they should
be liable for conspiring to commit torts, even when acting on behalf of
the principal. It has also suggested that principals should be vicari-
ously liable under respondeat superior theory for the acts of their
agents in conspiring if such acts were committed within the scope of
employment or agency. But liability for one's own acts, and respon-
deat superior liability for an agent's acts, are fairly uncontested pro-
positions. Why, then, do some courts apply vastly different standards
when limiting civil conspiracy liability for agents?
There are several possible explanations. First, courts often incor-
rectly frame the question as whether a corporation can conspire "with"
its agents (or with itself), rather than addressing two separate ques-
tions: whether the agent or agents' acts constitute a conspiracy, on the
one hand, and whether the corporation can be held vicariously liable
for those acts on the other. Second, the language that some courts
have used to express the scope of agents' immunity is unnecessarily
broad, and later courts have seized on this broad language to improp-
erly expand that immunity. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
courts may be using the agent's status as a proxy for the agent's lack
of intent, which goes to the very heart of the reason for imposing con-
spiracy liability at all.
A. The Fallacy of Agents Conspiring "With" the Corporation
The vicarious nature of a corporation's conspiracy liability is often
overlooked. 19 0 A corporation is never a separate actor that conspires
with its agents. Rather, it is held vicariously liable for the acts of its
agents in conspiring among themselves or with others.191 If a single
corporate agent acts unilaterally, the corporation should not "count"
as a second actor for purposes of the plurality requirement of conspir-
acy, whether in the context of antitrust, criminal law, common law
civil torts, RICO, or any other context. There is no "group danger"
when a single person acts alone; that he acts on behalf of a corporation
should not change that fact.192
190. See Mueller, supra note 175, at 40 ("[Tlhe common law has long ceased thinking
in terms of vicarious liability every time a corporation is said to breach the law
and is convicted."); Welling, supra note 39, at 1177 ("The vicarious nature of cor-
porate criminal liability often is overlooked, and should be emphasized to avoid
confusion in analyzing plurality standards.").
191. Welling, supra note 39, at 1177.
192. Of course, the corporation could be held liable under respondeat superior for the
agent's torts or crimes committed within the scope of his authority, regardless of
the presence or absence of conspiracy allegations.
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But where two or more agents combine with each other, the corpo-
ration need not count as a co-conspirator for plurality purposes, so
courts should not be permitted to hide behind the fiction of a lack of
plurality to deny conspiracy liability. Rather, in analyzing a multi-
agent intracorporate conspiracy, courts should analyze why the agents
and the corporation may or may not be liable.
When courts frame the issue in the loaded terms of whether or not
a corporation can conspire with itself or its agents, 193 they suggest
what the outcome will be.194 Take Worley v. Columbia Gas of Ken-
tucky, Inc.,195 for example. In Worley, the plaintiff subcontractor sued
a contractor, Mutual Pipeline Contractors, Inc., two of Mutual's of-
ficers, Dix and Norwicke, and several other entities with whom the
contractor dealt for conspiracy to maliciously prosecute the subcon-
tractor for issuing checks on insufficient funds. On appeal by the de-
fendants from the judgment, the Sixth Circuit first held that there
was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts against the non-con-
tracting entities, leaving only the contractor and its officers.19 6 The
court then held:
This disposition of the case determines the issue of conspiracy, because Mu-
tual could not conspire with itself or with its own officers to prosecute Worley.
Mutual could be liable only for acts of its officers on the theory of respondeat
superior. The corporation can act only through its officers and agents. We will
consider only whether there is substantial evidence to prove that Mutual, Dix
and Nowicke are liable for malicious prosecution of Worley. 1 9 7
The court was correct in asserting that the company "could be liable
only for acts of its officers on the theory of respondeat superior."19 8
However, respondeat superior liability is not necessarily inconsistent
with conspiracy liability. The court failed to consider the possibility
that the corporate agents, Dix and Norwicke, had conspired with each
other to commit malicious prosecution-as opposed to simply whether
they committed malicious prosecution directly. The court thus also
193. E.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.
1952) ("A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private individ-
ual can . . ").
194. See Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 109 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J.). The court set up the issue as follows:
Two rhetorical questions frame the dispute. (1) Why should action by a
single employer be covered by [42 U.S.C. § 19851 just because discus-
sions among the firm's multiple agents precede decision? (2) Why should
decisions taken by a plurality of actors be immune from check under
§ 1985 just because they take the trouble to incorporate? Which question
you pose largely determines the outcome. It is therefore not surprising
that courts have reached disparate conclusions.
Id.
195. 491 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1973).
196. Id. at 260-61.
197. Id. at 261.
198. Id.
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failed to consider whether the corporation could be held vicariously
liable for conspiracy.
The distinction would not have made a difference to the corpora-
tion, but it could have mattered as to the liability of the agents them-
selves. 19 9  Suppose Dix took the acts that allegedly caused the
wrongful prosecution-falsely promising plaintiff that Mutual would
advance funds to cover plaintiffs payroll checks-and Norwicke
agreed with Dix to do so. The corporation would be liable under re-
spondeat superior for Dix's acts, regardless of whether Norwicke con-
spired with him. But if the court refuses to consider whether there is
an inter-agent conspiracy between Dix and Norwicke, Norwicke es-
capes liability. Such an outcome promotes neither agency law nor con-
spiracy law nor tort law.
Moreover, whether or not an agent may be held liable for conspir-
acy could have a significant impact on a plaintiffs recovery. Corpo-
rate employers and principals are generally thought to have deeper
pockets than their agents and employees, so plaintiffs typically want
to hold the corporation liable for the torts of its agents, not vice versa.
However, where the principal is bankrupt or otherwise judgment-
proof, the agents may represent the plaintiffs best chance of collecting
on a judgment. Indeed, consider the lawsuits filed in the wake of the
collapse of Enron. Where the agents of a tortfeasor are some of the
world's largest financial institutions, like Citicorp or JPM Chase, con-
ventional wisdom that the agents do not have deep pockets simply
does not apply. Thus, a court's failure to distinguish between the
agent's and the corporation's conspiracy liability, which results in a
culpable agent escaping liability, could seriously impair a plaintiffs
ability to recover damages.
B. Courts Unnecessarily Overstate the Scope of Agents'
Immunity
Another reason that the scope of agents' civil conspiracy liability is
unsettled is that courts often articulate principles of immunity that
are broader than necessary to resolve the cases before them. For ex-
ample, Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.20 0 was one of the
earliest cases to adopt the single legal actor theory to bar a Sherman
Act claim premised on an alleged conspiracy among multiple agents of
a single corporation. But in so doing, the Nelson Radio court ex-
199. The outcome in Worley was not necessarily wrong: on the facts before it, the
court found that there was no evidence that any defendant had done anything
wrong, and that plaintiffs claim was defeated by numerous defenses in any
event. See id. at 261-63. However, the opinion is still problematic in that the
court's formulation of the scope of potential liability improperly framed the issue
and could set later courts astray.
200. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
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pressed a principle that was not necessarily confined to the antitrust
context:
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities
to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than
a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent
are the acts of the corporation.
2 0 1
Although it may be "basic" that conspiracy requires a plurality of ac-
tors, it is not basic that multiple agents of a single corporation do not
satisfy that plurality requirement. 2 02 Indeed, at the time the Fifth
Circuit handed down the opinion in Nelson Radio, the U.S. Supreme
Court had already upheld liability against multiple agents of a single
corporation under the general federal conspiracy statute.2 03 Thus,
only in the context of Sherman Act claims, where there is a concern
about chilling legitimate competition by proscribing intracorporate
conduct, was it "basic" that the acts of agents of a single corporation
did not satisfy the plurality requirement. Further, because Nelson
Radio's statement of the conspiracy rule was not tied to the substan-
tive antitrust considerations that justified its application, later courts
have relied on Nelson Radio to preclude conspiracy liability for torts
that have nothing to do with antitrust violations.204
Similarly, Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, Ltd. 205
relied on a case that immunized agents from liability for conspiracy to
interfere20 6-a ruling justified by economic considerations peculiar to
interference claims207-to state the broad proposition that "duly act-
ing agents and employees cannot be held liable for conspiring with
their own principals."2 08 But this was pure dicta: Applied Equipment
addressed only a claim against a contracting party for conspiring to
201. Id. at 914.
202. Welling, supra note 39, at 1162.
203. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) (upholding claim
against corporation and various of its agents for conspiracy to defraud the United
States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371).
204. See, e.g., Fojtik v. First Nat'l Bank, 752 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. App. 1988) (af-
firming broad principle of intracorporate conspiracy immunity from Nelson Ra-
dio, and allowing claim against bank and two of its directors for conspiracy to
commit fraud, conversion, and deceptive trade practices to proceed only because
plaintiff alleged that directors were acting for personal gain).
205. 869 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1994).
206. See id. at 458 & n.4 (citing Wise v. S. Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963)).
207. Although shielding agents from tort liability in order to shield contracting parties
from indirect tort liability for contractual breaches is the ultimate economic justi-
fication for the agent's privilege to interfere, see supra notes 116-19 and accom-
panying text, this was not the justification relied upon in Wise itself. See supra
note 116.
208. Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 458.
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interfere with its own contract, and thus did not deal with a claim for
conspiracy to interfere against an agent.2 09
At least one California court recognized the inconsistency between
the stated breadth of this principle in Applied Equipment and the
scope of the underlying duty requirement. Unfortunately, however,
the court resolved the conflict incorrectly, emphasizing the need for
clarification of the governing principles in this context. In Black v.
Bank of America,2 10 the defendant bank provided the plaintiff crop-
owners with a series of revolving secured agricultural loans. The
plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among the bank and various of its em-
ployees to conceal the decision not to renew the loans so that the plain-
tiffs would continue to invest in the next year's crop, making the crop
more valuable when the bank foreclosed on the security.2 11 The com-
plaint included claims for conspiracy to commit each of the following:
fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 2 12
The Black court noted that Applied Equipment "recently reaf-
firmed" the agent's immunity rule, which "has long been the rule in
California."2 13 However, according to Black, Applied Equipment "cre-
ates a conundrum" because it also suggests that "corporate employees
may be liable for conspiring with the corporation, despite their acting
on behalf of the corporation, when they owe a duty to the plaintiff in-
dependent of the corporation's duty," such as the "duty to abstain from
injuring the plaintiff through express misrepresentation." 2 14 The
Black court went on the explain the "conundrum":
Given the broadness of the type of duty that would apparently suffice to re-
move agents' immunity, and the ease with which a violation thereof may be
pled, this exception to the rule of agents' immunity, it seems to us, threatens
to swallow the rule. The Supreme Court does not reconcile its approval of this
broad exception to the rule of agent immunity with its express affirmation of
the rule itself.
2 1 5
This statement reflects the Black court's fundamental misconcep-
tion of the relationship between the agent's immunity rule and the
underlying duty requirement. The rule that someone can be liable for
conspiracy where they owe the plaintiff the underlying duty is not a
"broad exception to the rule of agent immunity." Rather, it is cotermi-
nous with the agent's immunity rule. Agents should only be provided
immunity when substantive policy reasons counsel doing so. Where
agents could be liable for committing the tort directly, no policy reason
209. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
210. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
211. Id. at 726.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 727.
215. Id. at 727 (citations omitted).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
counsels immunizing them from conspiring to commit the tort, even if
they do so with the intent to benefit the principal. Because even duly
acting agents are liable for their own fraud, the underlying duty re-
quirement does not exempt them from liability for conspiring to vio-
late the "duty to abstain from injuring the plaintiff through express
misrepresentation."216 If the agent's immunity rule protected them
where the underlying duty rule did not, the agent's immunity rule
would become a "broad exception" to the underlying duty requirement,
not vice versa.
The underlying duty requirement and the agent's immunity rule
are thus two different routes to the same place. If a policy choice has
been made that agents should be free from liability for acting in con-
cert-as it has been for claims of conspiracy to interfere with the prin-
cipal's contract or to restrain trade-then it does not matter whether
that freedom is couched in terms of not owing the underlying duty or
in terms of immunity.
Because the Black court failed to appreciate this relationship, it
reached the wrong result. The court "reconciled" the "conundrum" it
faced by distinguishing the cases relied upon byApplied Equipment as
involving
agents and employees outside the corporate structure of the principal,
[whereas] the present case involves allegations of a conspiracy between a sin-
gle corporation and its own employees .... In our view, the agent immunity
rule has particular force in such a situation.2 1 7
Granted, the fiction that the corporation is the sole legal actor has
more intuitive appeal where the alleged co-conspirators are all em-
ployees of the corporation, rather than retained outside agents. 2 18
But this distinction still fails to provide any policy-based reason to im-
munize corporate employees who allegedly, knowingly, and intention-
ally pursued a plan to defraud a customer. 2 19 Relying on a legal
fiction is necessarily circular logic, because it begs the question of
whether there is a justification for respecting the fiction. As was dis-
cussed above, consistency in application of agency principles is not a
justification, because agency law already bends to the will of substan-
tive law.
Moreover, if a corporation can only act through human agents, it is
not clear why the fact that those agents are or are not part of the
216. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217. Id. at 728.
218. This was a questionable basis for the court's holding, given that the California
supreme court in Doctors' Co. had rejected a purported distinction between
agents and independent contractors for purposes of conspiracy immunity. See
Doctors' Co. v. Super. Ct., 775 P.2d 508, 512 n.4 (Cal. 1989).
219. Given the procedural posture in Black-an appeal from the granting of a demur-
rer (motion to dismiss)-the court was required to accept the plaintiffs factual
allegations as true. See Black, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
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corporate structure should be dispositive. In the antitrust context,
where the anti-competitive concern is the collusion of separate busi-
ness entities that otherwise would be competing against one another,
this distinction may make sense. But given that the claim in Black
was for conspiracy to commit fraud, the court's failure to connect the
co-conspirators' employment status to any substantive policies of ei-
ther conspiracy or fraud doctrine rendered the opinion flawed.
C. Personal Gain as a Proxy for Intent
There is a potential policy-based explanation for courts broadly ap-
plying the agent's immunity rule. Courts may be using the fact that
an agent was acting solely on behalf of his or her principal or employer
as a substitute for a determination that the agent lacked the requisite
intent to be a true co-conspirator. Or, inversely, courts may use the
fact that the agent was acting for his or her own personal gain as a
proxy for the fact that he or she did possess the requisite intent.
This is a similar hypothesis to the one proposed earlier in connec-
tion with the underlying duty requirement.2 20 The hypothesis pro-
ceeds from the premise that courts are generally skeptical of
conspiracy claims. If the plaintiff could establish all of the elements of
the tort against the defendant, the plaintiff would not need conspiracy
allegations to hold the defendant liable. Courts may be reluctant to
impose tort liability on someone who did not commit a tort and may be
of the view that the amorphous doctrine of conspiracy is a blunt
weapon which may cause collateral damage; in other words, it may
result in the imposition of liability on innocent actors because of cir-
cumstantial evidence of an agreement. Any reluctance that might ex-
ist is likely heightened where the alleged co-conspirator is an agent of
the tortfeasor, because all agents, even wholly innocent ones, provide
assistance to their principals. Courts, in trying to weed out meritless
claims against innocent agents who are merely "doing their job," have
perhaps made doing one's job tantamount to lacking intent, and thus
have made acting on behalf of the principal dispositive in defeating
conspiracy liability.
This approach certainly has some appeal. Take the example of an
attorney who advises her client on a course of conduct that eventually
defrauds a third party: the attorney may or may not have known of
and intended to further the client's fraudulent purpose. The mere fact
that she provided the advice should not be sufficient circumstantial
evidence to infer an agreement; it is certainly not unheard of for cli-
ents to utilize the unwitting assistance of their attorneys to perpetrate
a wrong. The attorney is undoubtedly going to deny any intentional
collusion whether she actually colluded or not. So looking to her
220. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
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"stake" in the conspiracy may be a useful second-best alternative. If
the attorney simply receives her ordinary fee in serving the client, we
may feel confident that the attorney did nothing objectionable-no one
goes out on a limb to commit wrongdoing if there is nothing in it for
them. Conversely, if the attorney charges the client an increased fee
or a bonus payment, or took a percentage of the profits that the client
reaped as a result of the wrongful conduct, it would seem that the
attorney really was "in on" the fraud when she provided her services.
If courts are using personal gain as a proxy for knowledge of and
intent to further the wrongful object of the conspiracy, they should
consider the scienter elements of conspiracy claims directly. After all,
conspiracy law imposes liability, not upon all who combine to achieve
a purpose, but only upon all who combine with knowledge of and in-
tent to achieve a wrongful purpose. 2 21 The knowledge and intent ele-
ments intrinsic to all conspiracy claims should already winnow out
innocent actors. If an agent has an independent stake in the object of
the conspiracy, this is good circumstantial evidence that the agent
knew of the purpose of the conspiracy, and agreed to pursue it. But it
is only circumstantial evidence. Shifting the doctrinal focus away
from the intent element and considering the agent's personal gain as
an exception to a rule of immunity is both unhelpful and unnecessary.
Consider again Collins v. Union Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 22 2
wherein the bank and its officers allegedly conspired to induce poten-
tial purchasers of plaintiffs real estate to buy from the bank at fore-
closure sale instead of from the plaintiff directly. If it is true that the
bank officer defendants were merely following orders and were indif-
ferent to whether the plaintiff was cheated out of an opportunity to
sell the property, they should not be held liable for conspiracy because
they lacked the requisite intent. But they should not necessarily be
immune from liability. Suppose that the officers knew that they
would be getting a bonus of two percent of whatever sum the bank
earned at the foreclosure sale. This is evidence of their acting for per-
sonal gain-or at least may be, depending one's definition of personal
gain. 2 2 3 It is also evidence of their intent to wrongfully interfere with
plaintiffs prospective advantage with potential buyers. In this in-
stance, evidence of intent and evidence of gain overlap. But acting for
221. See supra notes 17, 29 and accompanying text.
222. 662 P.2d 610 (Nev. 1983); see supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Wegerer v. First Commodity Corp., 744 F.2d 719, 729 (10th Cir. 1984)
(McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court concluded:
If the exception to the rule is not limited to situations where an officer or
employee receives a benefit or personal gain from an outside source, the
rule will be swallowed up by the exception. Large salaries, bonuses, per-
sonal loans, stock options, etc. are common methods of remuneration for
officers of corporations.
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personal gain is not the only possible circumstantial evidence of in-
tent. Suppose the corporate officers got no bonus for wooing prospec-
tive purchasers away from the plaintiff, but intentionally did so
anyway with full knowledge that it would harm the plaintiff simply
because they felt loyalty to the bank, or because they personally dis-
liked the plaintiff. In these circumstances, should the lack of personal
gain immunize them and defeat the claim at the pleading stage?
The hypothetical permutations of Collins indicate that the per-
sonal gain/corporate benefit test produces no better results than a
straightforward intent test, and possibly worse results. To borrow an
economic term, the intent test is Pareto superior and so should be
used in lieu of the agent's immunity rule and personal gain exception
thereto.
One could counter that the intent requirement is insufficient to
protect agents from conspiracy claims, because intent is necessarily a
fact-intensive inquiry that is not amenable to resolution on a motion
to dismiss or even at summary judgment.22 4 Under this view, requir-
ing a plaintiff to allege and prove that the agent acted for personal
gain will weed out specious claims earlier and more often than would
otherwise occur with an unfiltered intent test.
As an initial matter, this assumes that there are "too many" con-
spiracy claims being levied against agents. It is impossible to tell
without empirical evidence. In any event, the personal gain exception
is hardly of greater benefit to agents than the intent requirement.
Under the personal gain exception, a plaintiff need not allege or prove
that the agent received a personal benefit, only that the agent acted
for the purpose of obtaining a benefit. 225 Because the personal gain
exception is really a personal motive exception, it requires delving into
the mind of the agent just as much as the intent requirement does.
Thus, it should be equally as resistant to resolution by motion.
Furthermore, courts are not always unwilling to resolve questions
of intent as a matter of law. Where the agent defendant truly is just
an innocent servant "doing her job," the plaintiff should be unable to
produce the requisite circumstantial evidence of intent even after an
opportunity to conduct discovery, so courts would likely dispose of
such claims by summary judgment, 22 6 or sooner. Even at the plead-
224. See, e.g., In re Barral, 153 B.R. 15, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Findings as to fraudulent
intent are peculiarly fact-intensive and as an affirmative finding can rarely be
made as a matter of law.").
225. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.10(c) (1998 & Supp. 2005) (allowing conspiracy
claim against attorney to proceed without prior court approval if plaintiff alleges
that attorney acted "in furtherance of the attorney's financial gain") (emphasis
added).
226. See, e.g., Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 468 (1st Cir. 1975). Importantly, a
party against whom summary judgment is sought is [not] entitled to a
trial simply because he has asserted a cause of action to which state of
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ing stage, courts may grant a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff is
unable to allege any facts from which one could reasonably infer that
the defendant acted with intent.22 7 Where it was the agent's job to do
the act which constitutes his or her alleged role in the conspiracy, the
conduct alone should be insufficient to reasonably infer intent; rather,
the plaintiff should be required to show some "plus factor" above and
beyond the conduct itself.
In many instances, acting for financial gain may be the primary, if
not only, evidence of such intent. If so, then the practical effect of re-
quiring the plaintiff to show intent instead of financial gain may be
minimal. But as this Article has demonstrated, there is a potential for
the agent's immunity rule/personal gain exception paradigm to excuse
culpable agents, without any corollary promotion of substantive pol-
icy. Moreover, from a doctrinal standpoint, avoiding a separate test of
personal gain will make judicial decision-making more reasoned and
predictable, which may ultimately be a benefit not only to the legal
community, but to the business community as well.
To the extent that there is a concern that the mere filing of a civil
conspiracy claim against an agent will be disruptive of a particular
principal-agent relationship, Congress or the states' legislatures are
free to create additional barriers to suit. California, for example, has
passed a statute requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate to the court a
reasonable probability of success before filing a claim against an attor-
ney for conspiring with his or her client.228 One could debate the rela-
mind is a material element. There must be some indication that he can
produce the requisite quantum of evidence to enable him to reach the
jury with his claim.
Id.; see also Moran v. Bench, 353 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1965) (granting summary
judgment on conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985: "[Bly the bare
use of the word 'conspiracy,' with no supporting facts that tend to show the exis-
tence of an unlawful agreement or prima facie improper behavior, [appellant] has
not met the burden of countering affidavits making such explicit denials.").
227. See, e.g., Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding in securities fraud context that, "[a]lthough scienter may be
"averred generally," case law amply demonstrates that pleading scienter requires
more than a simple allegation that a defendant had fraudulent intent. To plead
scienter adequately, a plaintiff must set forth specific facts that support an infer-
ence of fraud"). But see, e.g., In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546
(9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting requirement of pleading facts from which intent may be
inferred).
228. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 1714.10 (1998 & Supp. 2005). Ironically, the drafters of the
statute, relying on some of the same flawed case law discussed in this Article,
have exempted plaintiffs from the pre-complaint requirement where they allege,
among other things, that the attorney acted not merely to serve the client but "in
furtherance of the attorney's financial gain." Id. at subparagraph (c). Ostensibly,
a plaintiff could always allege that the attorney acted for his or her own financial
gain, and at least make it to the pleading stage. One court has noted that, given
the exceptions contained therein, section 1714.10 does not apply to any viable
conspiracy claims. See Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 134 (2000)
[Vol. 84:1
20051 TOWARD COHERENCE IN CIVIL CONSPIRACY LAW 53
tive institutional authority or competence of courts and legislatures to
make policy choices about which classes of agents should be exempt
from which classes of conspiracy claims. But the thrust of this Article
is that, whoever makes the choice, it should be based on policy, not
blind adherence to precedent or legal fictions.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conspiracy is an inherently nebulous concept, and civil conspiracy,
which is not even a tort, is more nebulous. But it is no solution to
limit civil conspiracy claims with a yet more nebulous agent's immu-
nity rule. The agent's immunity rule is a doctrine that has developed
at the crossroads of conspiracy law, substantive tort law, and agency
law. Where the policies of these fields run up against one another, one
or more must yield the right of way. But there needs to be an order of
priority so that all will know who should yield to whom.
As we have seen, the other major limitation on civil conspiracy-
the underlying duty requirement-compromises conspiracy policies of
preventing group danger only where necessary to promote tort poli-
cies. And although the agent's immunity rule (as an extension of the
single legal actor theory) ostensibly serves to maintain the "policy" of
principal-agent unity, that formalistic principle has always been se-
lectively applied in differing conspiracy contexts according to the dic-
tates of substantive law.
In the civil conspiracy context, then, substantive tort law should
rule the road. Where conspiracy policy is not in conflict with tort pol-
icy, they should both be promoted to the extent possible. And it is only
where agency law does not conflict with either of the above that its
policies should be promoted.
This order of priority can be expressed as follows. When faced with
a claim against an agent for conspiring with his or her principal or
employer to commit a tort, courts should ask at least five questions.
First, is there more than one individual who is an alleged participant
in the conspiracy? If not, the conspiracy claims should fail outright for
inability to satisfy the plurality element. This will bar conspiracy
claims premised on unilateral acts of a corporate agent, because the
corporation should not "count" as a second actor for purposes of the
plurality requirement. Whatever tort the lone agent may have com-
mitted must be alleged independent of conspiracy allegations. Where
the principal is an individual and not a corporation, however, a single
agent truly can conspire "with" the principal, so the conspiracy claim
is potentially viable.
("[I]t appears that the pleading hurdle would only apply to attorney/client con-
spiracy causes of action which are not viable in any event. In such circumstances,
overcoming the pleading hurdle is the least of the plaintiffs worries.").
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Second, is there a policy reason to immunize the agent from liabil-
ity for the underlying tort? If so, the agent should not owe that tort
duty, and the underlying duty requirement will immunize the agent
from liability for conspiracy to commit the tort.
Third, is there a policy reason to avoid proscribing the coordinated
acts of multiple agents acting within or on behalf of a corporation?
Because this question involves considerations of substantive policy,
the outcome should typically be the same as that reached under the
second question. The two contexts in which agent's immunity have
been properly upheld-contractual interference conspiracies and anti-
trust conspiracies-both involved the promotion of beneficial economic
activity achieved through coordinated conduct.
Fourth, assuming there is no reason to exempt the agent or agents
from conspiracy liability outright under questions two or three, did
the agent(s) enter into an agreement with knowledge of and intent to
achieve the wrongful object of the alleged conspiracy? Under this
question, whether the agent acted in furtherance of his or her per-
sonal gain is relevant circumstantial evidence of intent, but is not dis-
positive of whether the plaintiff states a claim against the agent.
Fifth, should the corporate principal be held liable for the agent's
act of conspiring under respondeat superior principles? That is to say,
was the agent acting within the course and scope of his agency or em-
ployment and with the intent to benefit the principal when he con-
spired? Here, too, the fact that the agent acted for his personal gain
instead of to benefit the employer has relevance, but not for the rea-
sons typically assumed by courts under the agent's immunity rule.
Given the uncertainties that are intrinsic to conspiracy doctrine,
application of this analytical framework will by no means solve all the
problems courts face in dealing with civil conspiracy claims. It would,
however, certainly be a step in the right direction.
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